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Reconsidering Substantive Canons
Anita S. Krishnakumar†
This Article provides the first empirical study of the Roberts Court’s use of
substantive canons in statutory interpretation cases. Based on data from 296 cases,
the Article argues that much of the conventional wisdom about substantive canons
of statutory construction is wrong, or at least overstated with respect to the modern
Supreme Court. Substantive canons—for example, the rule of lenity, the avoidance
canon, and the presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic laws—
have long been criticized as undemocratic judge-made rules that defeat congressional intent, enable interpreters to massage different meanings out of the same
text, and make statutory interpretation unpredictable. Scholars have bemoaned the
amount of work that substantive canons perform in statutory interpretation cases,
and several have charged that textualist judges in particular overuse such canons.
But virtually all of these critiques have occurred in the absence of empirical evidence about how judges invoke substantive canons in practice.
This Article reconsiders the substantive canons in light of new data collected
from the Roberts Court. The data show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom,
substantive canons are infrequently invoked on the modern Court—and even when
invoked, they rarely play an outcome-determinative role in the Court’s statutory
constructions. Perhaps most surprisingly, textualist justices—including Justice
Antonin Scalia—rarely invoke substantive canons in the opinions they author, and
do so less often than most of their purposivist counterparts. Moreover, contrary to
the conventional view that substantive canons empower judges to read their personal policy preferences into statutes, the Court’s conservative justices have employed substantive canons to support liberal case outcomes as often, or nearly as
often, as they have employed such canons to support conservative outcomes. Further, doctrinal analysis shows that the Roberts Court repeatedly has used substantive canons to honor, rather than frustrate, congressional intent.
The Article also challenges scholars’ gloomy warnings that justices in
the modern, textualism-influenced era have replaced legislative history with
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substantive canons as the go-to resource for deciphering ambiguous statutory text.
Rather, the data from the Roberts Court show that most of the justices referenced
legislative history at higher rates than they referenced substantive canons. Moreover, the Court’s own precedents—rather than substantive canons or legislative
history—seem to be the unsung gap-filling mechanism that the justices turn to
when confronted with unclear statutory text. After reporting the data, the Article
discusses the implications of its findings for current debates in statutory interpretation, arguing that statutory interpretation theory needs to pay less attention to
substantive canons and more attention to how the Court employs precedents when
construing statutes.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a popular belief among statutory interpretation
scholars that substantive canons of statutory construction—that
is, policy-based background norms or presumptions such as the
rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional avoidance—act as an
“escape valve” that helps textualist judges eschew, or “mitigate,”
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the rigors of textualism.1 As Professor William Eskridge has
noted, “[T]he textualist who refuses to consider legislative history will be sorely tempted to rely on [substantive canons] to
provide necessary context and analysis for deciding issues of interpretation.”2 The conventional wisdom is that substantive canons operate as an interpretive trump card, allowing judges to reject statutory readings dictated by other tools of construction in
favor of readings based on external policy considerations.3 In the
conventional telling, substantive canons are thought to wield
significant power—indeed, too much power—over interpretive
outcomes.
Scholars on both sides of the textualist-purposivist divide
have criticized substantive canons, although textualists also
have defended some substantive canons as entrenched background conventions that Congress is aware of when it legislates.4 Justice Antonin Scalia, notably, decried substantive canons as “dice-loading” devices;5 but he, in turn, has been accused
of employing such canons generously when it suited his ends.6
Scholars have pointed out that substantive canons are countermajoritarian, subject to judicial invention and reinvention, and

1
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum L Rev 1,
125 (2001). See also William N. Eskridge Jr, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation
and Regulation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 743 (West Academic 5th ed
2014) (“Critics could suggest that . . . every human interpretive technique, including textualism, needs a ‘safety valve’ of some sort.”).
2
William N. Eskridge Jr, Book Review, Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich
L Rev 1509, 1542 (1998), reviewing Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law (Princeton 1997) (Amy Gutmann, ed).
3
See, for example, Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency,
90 BU L Rev 109, 109–10 (2010); Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545–46 (cited
in note 2).
4
See Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1); Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 29 (cited in note 2) (defending the rule of lenity and rules requiring a clear
statement to eliminate state sovereignty or to waive the federal government’s sovereign
immunity).
5
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 28 (cited in note 2).
6
See, for example, Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1512 n 9 (cited in
note 2) (“Scalia warns that ‘to the honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and
presumptions are a lot of trouble,’ and criticizes the substantive canons. Yet Scalia himself not only cites but heavily relies on these ‘substantive’ canons.”) (brackets and citations omitted); id at 1543–46 (discussing Scalia’s use of a substantive canon in BFP v
Resolution Trust Corp, 511 US 531 (1994)); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective
Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 Ky L J 527, 551 (1997–98) (“Justice Scalia and
other modern textualists often use ‘clear-statement canons’ that require express congressional authorization for a particular type of government regulatory action.”).
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difficult for Congress to overcome.7 Recent work has characterized substantive canons as the equivalent of federal common
law, explored the theoretical tension between textualism and the
substantive canons, and concluded that the constitutionally
based canons, at least, are defensible on a “faithful agent” theory
of statutory interpretation.8
Virtually all of this theorizing has occurred in the absence of
empirical evidence about how often judges invoke substantive
canons or how much work such canons perform in statutory cases
when invoked. There is a general consensus that the avoidance
canon has been much abused9 and that the rule of lenity has
fallen into disuse,10 but no one has examined the federal courts’
7
See, for example, Neal Kumar Katyal and Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv L Rev 2109, 2119 (2015);
William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand L Rev 593, 636–40 (1992); Eskridge,
Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1542–43 (cited in note 2); William N. Eskridge Jr, The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621, 683–84 (1990).
8
See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for
the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 753, 778–79 (2013) (theorizing that at least some
of the canons might be viewed as a kind of federal common law); Barrett, 90 BU L Rev at
169 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that judges act as “faithful agents of the Constitution”
when they apply constitutionally based substantive canons).
9
See, for example, Katyal and Schmidt, 128 Harv L Rev at 2129–53 (cited in
note 7) (discussing and critiquing the use of the avoidance canon in several recent
Supreme Court cases); Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public
Choice to Improve Public Law 105 (Yale 1997) (describing the avoidance canon as suboptimal given game theory analysis); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions
as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L Rev 831, 834–35 (2001) (calling for the abandonment of the avoidance canon on separation-of-powers grounds); John F. Manning,
The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 S Ct Rev 223, 228 (criticizing
the enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine through the use of the avoidance canon);
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 S Ct Rev 71, 94–95 (criticizing the avoidance canon as being disguised judicial activism); Harry H. Wellington, Machinists v.
Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 S Ct
Rev 49, 49–50, 73 (criticizing a specific application of the avoidance canon); Clay v Sun
Insurance Office Ltd, 363 US 207, 213–14 (1960) (Black dissenting) (accusing the Court
of “carrying the doctrine of avoiding constitutional questions to a wholly unjustifiable
extreme,” and arguing that “there are times when a constitutional question is so important that it should be decided even though judicial ingenuity would find a way to
escape it”); Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in
Wallace Mendelson, ed, Felix Frankfurter: The Judge 30, 45 (Reynal 1964) (warning that
the avoidance canon risks judicial rewriting of statutes); Richard A. Posner, The Federal
Courts: Crisis and Reform 284–86 (Harvard 1985) (similar); Reno v Flores, 507 US 292,
314 n 9 (1993) (calling the avoidance canon “the last refuge of many an interpretive lost
cause”).
10 See, for example, Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72
Fordham L Rev 885, 885 (2004) (arguing that the rule “has lately fallen out of favor with
both courts and commentators”); The Supreme Court 2007 Term: Leading Cases, 122
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use of substantive canons systematically. Instead, based on anecdote and speculation, much of it fueled by the Rehnquist
Court’s creation of several federalism clear statement rules in
the 1980s and 1990s or the Roberts Court’s use of the avoidance
canon in recent high-profile cases,11 scholars have taken for
granted that substantive canons play a regular, decisive role in
the judicial interpretation of statutes—and that textualism
needs to articulate a justification for its subscribers’ frequent
use of such canons. But what if it turns out that these scholarly
assumptions are wrong—or at least overstated—in several important respects?
This Article provides the first empirical study of the Roberts
Court’s use of substantive canons in its statutory interpretation
cases. Based on data from 296 statutory interpretation cases decided by the Roberts Court during its first six and a half terms,
the Article reports several surprising findings that call into
doubt the conventional account of substantive canons and, particularly, their relationship to textualism. Five points stand out:
(1) contrary to popular claims that textualist judges rely on substantive canons frequently, the Court’s textualist justices rarely
invoked substantive canons in the opinions they authored (11.0
percent and 11.7 percent for Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas,
respectively), and did so no more often than their nontextualist
counterparts;12 (2) despite the ubiquity of substantive canons and
charges that judges regularly invent new ones, only a handful of
Harv L Rev 276, 475 (2008) (“Though lenity was a robust doctrine for much of this country’s legal development, in recent decades lenity has been disfavored, a deciding factor in
only a limited subset of cases if at all.”). See also Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 Harv
L Rev 2420, 2420 (2006).
11 See, for example, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v
Holder, 557 US 193, 205 (2009); National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius,
132 S Ct 2566, 2594 (2012).
12 See Table 1. Note also that two of the Court’s textualist-leaning justices, Justices
Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy, likewise referenced substantive canons at decidedly
low rates (< 20.0 percent), as did most of the nontextualist justices. See id. For characterizations of Alito and Kennedy as textualist judges, see Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 Colum L Rev 1883, 1887 & n 14 (2008) (“[I]t appears that several Justices—
clearly Justices Scalia and Thomas, and perhaps Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito
and Kennedy—on the Supreme Court now consider themselves textualists.”); John F.
Duffy, In re Nuijten: Patentable Subject Matter, Textualism and the Supreme Court
(Patently-O, Feb 5, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/J86F-NXGF (“[T]here is now likely
a majority of current Justices (including the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas and Alito) who adhere to some form of fairly rigorous textualism in statutory
interpretation.”); Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 & n 505 (cited in note 1) (calling
Kennedy a textualist’s “fellow traveler[ ]”).
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substantive canons appear to be doing meaningful work on the
modern Court;13 (3) a majority of the Roberts Court’s references
to substantive canons have been in passing, as makeweight or
secondary arguments, with only a small number of cases relying
significantly on such canons; (4) when the Court did rely significantly on substantive canons, it often exhibited more attentiveness to Congress’s intent than the conventional view of substantive canons accounts for; and (5) contrary to the popular belief
that substantive canons empower judges to decide cases based
on their personal policy preferences, the Court’s conservative
justices invoked substantive canons to support liberal outcomes
nearly as often, and in some cases more often, than they invoked
such canons to support conservative outcomes.
These findings have important theoretical implications. For
example, they raise the question: If textualist judges are not relying on substantive canons to mitigate the rigors of textualism,
then what interpretive tools are they using to serve that function?
Data from textualist-authored opinions in which substantive
canons were not used suggest that the answer to this question
is Supreme Court precedent and, to some extent, practicalconsequences-based reasoning.14 The findings also suggest that
some of the criticisms leveled against substantive canons may be
overstated—for example, substantive canons may be less prone
to invention and reinvention than previously thought. Indeed, in
six and a half terms, I counted only four instances in which the
members of the Roberts Court invoked an arguably “new” substantive canon—and over half of the Court’s substantive canon
references involved one of just six well-established canons.15 This
means that despite the wide array of substantive canons created
over the past two centuries, the Roberts Court was remarkably
constrained, and somewhat predictable, in the canons it tended
to invoke. The data also suggest that substantive canons may be
applied in a manner that is more supportive of congressional intent than the conventional account recognizes.16 Doctrinal analysis of the handful of cases in the data set in which the Court did
rely significantly on substantive canons reveals that, in several
instances, the Court used the avoidance canon to read a statute

13
14
15
16

See Appendix (listing cases and substantive canons invoked).
See Part III.B.
See Appendix; text accompanying notes 140–41.
See Part II.C.
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in a manner that honored a recent congressional override, or to
preserve a long-standing statute against constitutional challenge.17 In other cases, the Court employed substantive canons
in tandem with, or as an approximation of, congressional intent.18 These cases stand in marked contrast to the conventional
wisdom—including recent commentary about the Roberts
Court19—arguing that the Court uses substantive canons to displace legislative preferences with judicial ones.
Further, the data from this study suggest that, in practice,
there may not be the stark textualist-purposivist divide that
scholars have described regarding whether to consult substantive canons or legislative history to provide contextual clues
about statutory meaning.20 As Part II describes in detail, eight of
the eleven justices who have served on the Roberts Court for a
significant amount of time have referenced legislative history at
higher rates—sometimes much higher rates—than they have
referenced substantive canons. Even archtextualist Scalia invoked substantive canons at almost the same rate as he invoked
legislative history—an interpretive resource he considered illegitimate—and Thomas referenced both of these tools at quite
low rates, suggesting a miserly view of both.21 In addition, the
data on levels of reliance provide some support for pragmatists’
contentions that the canons of construction do not play much of
a role in the judicial interpretation of statutes, and that judges

17

See Parts II.C.1–2.
See Part II.C.3.
19 See Katyal and Schmidt, 128 Harv L Rev at 2112 (cited in note 7) (arguing that
the Roberts Court employs “[a]ctive avoidance” that emboldens judicial activism and
“leads to tortured constructions of statutes that bear little resemblance to laws actually
passed by the elected branches”); Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One Last Chance, 17
Green Bag 2d 173, 182–84 (2014).
20 See, for example, Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L J
1750, 1842 (2010) (asserting that the Supreme Court currently is grappling with the
question of “how ambiguity is discerned and, once found, whether legislative history or
canons come next,” and that “at least part of what divides textualists from purposivists
on the modern U.S. Supreme Court seems to be that textualists put canons second,
whereas purposivists choose legislative history most of the time”).
21 See Table 1 (reporting that Scalia referenced substantive canons in 11.0 percent
(nine of eighty-two) of the cases he authored and legislative history in 9.8 percent (eight
of eighty-two), and that Thomas invoked substantive canons in 11.7 percent (nine of
seventy-seven) of the cases he authored and legislative history in 7.8 percent (six of
seventy-seven)).
18
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use them as mere “window-dressing” to shore up interpretations
reached primarily through other tools.22
Finally, taken as a whole, the data suggest that the Roberts
Court’s treatment of substantive canons correlates surprisingly
well with the methodological stare decisis employed by several
state courts—which place substantive canons last in the hierarchy of statutory construction tools23—and with the rules of statutory construction codified by many state legislatures, which list
only a handful of substantive canons among the rules they instruct state courts to follow.24 The Roberts Court’s limited use of
substantive canons also seems to accord with the preferences of
congressional staffers in charge of drafting legislation, who rank
substantive canons behind legislative history and rules on
agency deference when asked about the usefulness of particular
interpretive aids.25
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the
conventional understanding of substantive canons. Part II reports the findings from my study of the Roberts Court’s substantive canon use from January 2006, when Justice Samuel Alito
joined the Court, to the end of the Court’s 2011 term. It also
provides doctrinal analysis of several cases in which the Court
relied significantly on substantive canons, and examines the
tools the Court invoked when it did not reference substantive
canons. Part III explores the theoretical implications of the data
and doctrinal observations.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT
Before exploring the conventional wisdom surrounding substantive canons in detail, it is worth pausing for a moment to
22 William N. Eskridge Jr, Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U Chi L Rev 671, 679 (1999). See also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory
of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3
Vand L Rev 395, 401 (1950) (“[T]o make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the
construction contended for must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the
canon.”).
23 See Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1778, 1805–06 (cited in note 20) (describing approaches
adopted by several state supreme courts).
24 See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
Georgetown L J 341, 382–401 (2010).
25 See Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901, 966 (2013) (showing legislative drafters’ perceptions of which
interpretive tools are most useful to courts in determining congressional intent).
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define some terms. First, what are “substantive canons”? “The
phrase ‘canons of construction’ is understood to encompass a set
of background norms and conventions that are used by courts
when interpreting statutes.”26 Many scholars further divide the
“canons of construction” into two categories: language canons
and substantive canons.27 Language canons, as their name suggests, focus on the text of the statute and encompass rules of
syntax and grammar, “whole act” rules about how different provisions of the same statute should be read in connection with
each other (for example, to minimize internal inconsistency or to
avoid superfluity), and Latin maxims such as expressio unius est
exclusio alterius and noscitur a sociis.28 Substantive canons, by
contrast, are principles and presumptions that judges have created to protect important background norms derived from the
Constitution, common-law practices, or policies related to particular subject areas.29 Substantive canons sometimes operate as
tiebreakers, or thumbs on the scale, but in recent years they

26 James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand L Rev 1, 7 (2005), citing Cass R. Sunstein, After
the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State 147 (Harvard 1990).
27 For detailed explanations of this dichotomy, see David L. Shapiro, Continuity
and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 NYU L Rev 921, 927–41 (1992); Eskridge, et
al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 643, 657–59, 690–93 (cited in
note 1); Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 12–14 (cited in note 26). Language canons and substantive canons are also sometimes referred to as descriptive and normative
canons. See Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress
Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 Vand L Rev 561, 563 (1992) (summarizing the distinction between descriptive canons, which are based on particular uses of language, grammar, or syntax, and normative canons, which dictate that ambiguous text be construed
in favor of certain judicially crafted policy objectives).
28 For examples of all of these types of language canons, see Eskridge, et al, Cases
and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 657–90 (cited in note 1). The maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “expression . . . of one thing indicates exclusion of the other.” Id at 668. The rule rests on a logical assumption of negative implication; if the legislature specifically enumerates certain items in a statute, this is taken to
imply a deliberate exclusion of all other items. Id. See also Norman J. Singer and
Shambie Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:23 at 406–13 (Thomson
Reuters rev 7th ed 2014). Noscitur a sociis means “[i]t is known from its associates.”
Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 658 (cited in
note 1) (brackets in original). Thus, when a statute contains a list of two or more words,
courts are to give each word in the list a meaning that is consistent with the meaning of
other words in the list. See Singer and Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction
§ 47:16 at 353–59 (cited in note 28); Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation
and Regulation at 658–59 (cited in note 1).
29 See Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 643
(cited in note 1).
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have been accused of playing a much more determinative role in
the Court’s statutory cases.30
Perhaps the most famous substantive canon is the rule of
lenity, which holds that ambiguities in criminal statutes must be
resolved in favor of the defendant.31 A close second is the canon of
constitutional avoidance, which holds that if there are two or
more plausible readings of a statute, and one of these raises serious constitutional concerns, the Court should adopt the reading that avoids the constitutional problem.32 Other well-known
substantive canons include: the rule that waivers of sovereign
immunity should be narrowly construed,33 a rule requiring a
“clear statement” before a federal statute may be read to intrude
in areas traditionally regulated by states,34 a rule that ambiguities in statutes dealing with Indian tribes are to be resolved in
favor of the tribes,35 a rule that statutes in derogation of the
common law are to be narrowly construed,36 a rule that remedial

30

See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 13 & n 53 (cited in note 26).
See Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 3 Statutes and Statutory Construction § 59:3 at 167–75 (Thomson Reuters/West 7th ed 2008); United States v Wiltberger, 18
US (5 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820) (describing the rule as “perhaps not much less old than construction itself”); Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at
693–96 (cited in note 1).
32 See, for example, Rapanos v United States, 547 US 715, 737–38 & n 9 (2006)
(Scalia) (plurality); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp v Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council, 485 US 568, 575 (1988); United States v Delaware and Hudson
Co, 213 US 366, 407–08 (1909). See also Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal L Rev 397, 399–401 (2005); Schauer, 1995
S Ct Rev at 83 (cited in note 9); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional
Doubts: The Supreme Court’s Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30
UC Davis L Rev 1, 88–90 (1996); Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter at 45 (cited in note 9);
Posner, The Federal Courts at 285 (cited in note 9); Wellington, 1961 S Ct Rev at 67–71
(cited in note 9).
33 See, for example, Federal Aviation Administration v Cooper, 132 S Ct 1441, 1453
(2012); United States v White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 US 465, 472 (2003); United
States v Nordic Village, Inc, 503 US 30, 33–34 (1992).
34 See, for example, Rapanos, 547 US at 737–38 (Scalia) (plurality); BFP v Resolution Trust Corp, 511 US 531, 544 (1994); Gregory v Ashcroft, 501 US 452, 460–61 (1991).
35 See, for example, Carcieri v Salazar, 555 US 379, 413–14 (2009) (Stevens dissenting); Montana v Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 US 759, 766–68 (1985).
36 See, for example, Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority v Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co of Virginia, 464 US 30, 35–36 (1983); Robert C. Herd & Co, Inc v
Krawill Machinery Corp, 359 US 297, 304–05 (1959).
31

KRISHNAKUMAR_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Reconsidering Substantive Canons

6/14/2017 11:25 AM

835

statutes are to be construed liberally,37 and a rule that interpretive doubts should be resolved in favor of veterans.38
As the above list illustrates, substantive canons come in many
varieties. Most take one of three forms: (1) “presumptions,” or
“rules of thumb that cut across different types of statutes” and
“that the Court will ‘presume’ Congress intends to incorporate
into statutes”;39 (2) “liberal” or “strict” construction canons,
which direct courts to read statutes dealing with certain subject
areas either expansively or narrowly;40 and (3) “clear statement
rules,” which require a clear statement on the face of the statute
in order to rebut a policy presumption the Court has created.41
The next Section discusses prevailing scholarly assumptions
about how these policy-based canons operate.
A.

The Prevailing Wisdom

Statutory interpretation scholars of widely divergent philosophies tend to converge in several respects in their views about
substantive canons. They agree, for example, that textualist
judges employ substantive canons regularly42 and, at the same
time, that there is significant theoretical tension between substantive canons and textualism.43 Implicit in these two points of
convergence are two additional assumptions—that substantive
canons play a significant role in the interpretation of statutes
37 See, for example, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co v Buell, 480 US 557,
562 (1987); Tcherepnin v Knight, 389 US 332, 336 (1967).
38 See, for example, King v St. Vincent’s Hospital, 502 US 215, 220 n 9 (1991).
39 Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 691 (cited
in note 1).
40 See id at 690–91.
41 Id at 692 (emphasis omitted).
42 See, for example, Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1542–43 (cited in note 2);
John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101
Colum L Rev 1648, 1655 (2001) (describing textualists’ use of “constitutionally inspired
clear statement rules”); Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1758 (cited in note 20) (contending that
textualist judges “widely employ the substantive canons”); Mank, 86 Ky L J at 552 (cited
in note 6) (arguing that textualists “frequently” employ federalism clear statement
rules); Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L Rev 914, 929 (2012) (noting that
“textualist judges are particularly fond of clear statement rules”).
43 See, for example, Barrett, 90 BU L Rev at 121–25 (cited in note 3); Jim Chen,
Law as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 Wash U L Q 1263, 1303 (1995) (“[T]he new
textualism consistently undermines its stated right-branching approach by its increasing
reliance on clear statement rules and other constitutionally informed substantive canons.”); Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 28 (cited in note 2) (“To the honest textualist,
all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot of trouble.”); Manning, 101 Colum
L Rev at 125–26 (cited in note 1).
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and that their effect is to displace legislative policy preferences
with judicial ones.44
On one side of the statutory interpretation divide, pragmatist Professor Eskridge has posited that “a textualism refusing
to consider the legislative context of statutes is going to be
tempted not only to rely on substantive canons, but also to develop them, common law style.”45 He and others have observed
that, despite criticizing substantive canons in theory, leading
textualist Justice Scalia “not only cites but heavily relies on
these ‘substantive’ canons” when deciding cases.46 Eskridge argued that this textualist reliance on substantive canons is problematic, because it allows judges to elide statutory language and
to invent or adjust the rules that govern statutory construction
as they go along.47
On the opposite side of the interpretive divide, textualist
scholar Professor John Manning has made similar observations.
Manning has noted, for example, that devices like the avoidance
canon and clear statement rules “mitigate the textualists’ strict
focus on the conventional meaning of the enacted text.”48 Further, he has acknowledged that these canons are in tension with
“the most basic textualist assumptions” and that some textualists
or textualist-sympathetic judges “have recognized the necessity

44 Scholarly views regarding language canons have been more mixed. Some scholars have argued that, like substantive canons, language canons are used to frustrate or
undermine legislative intent. See James J. Brudney, Faithful Agency versus Ordinary
Meaning Advocacy, 57 SLU L J 975, 983 (2013), citing generally Brudney and Ditslear,
58 Vand L Rev 1 (cited in note 26). Others have argued that language canons approximate the way Congress drafts and, therefore, that their use fulfills legislative intent.
See, for example, Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347, 383–84 (2005)
(arguing that canons like noscitur a sociis and expressio unius est exclusio alterius reflect
the “likely intent of the enacting legislature”). See also Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation
at 25–26 (cited in note 2) (describing language canons such as noscitur a sociis and
expressio unius est exclusio alterius as “commonsensical”); Gluck and Bressman, 65
Stan L Rev at 932–33 (cited in note 25) (reporting that a study of congressional staffers
revealed that the majority of them believed that the assumptions underlying the noscitur
a sociis and ejusdem generis canons “always or often” apply).
45 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545 (cited in note 2).
46 Id at 1512 n 9. See also, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance
and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 S Ct Rev 181, 186.
47 See Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545–46 (cited in note 2) (“[A]s
new canons are created or strengthened and old ones narrowed as Supreme Court composition changes, the honest textualist becomes just as unpredictable as, and may even
come to resemble, her doppelganger the willful judge.”).
48 Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1). See also Manning, 101 Colum
L Rev at 1655 (cited in note 42).
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for restrained application of such tools of construction.”49 In addition, although Manning has defended certain substantive canons as reflecting “established background conventions,” he has
conceded that when textualists create new substantive canons,
they should be forced to justify their reliance on such interpretive tools.50
Other scholars with less clearly staked-out jurisprudential
philosophies have echoed these assumptions as well. Professor
Amanda Frost has noted that “textualist judges are particularly
fond of clear statement rules, which aid them in interpreting
ambiguous statutes without the need to resort to legislative history.”51 And Professor Amy Coney Barrett has argued that textualists “embrace” many substantive canons, including the canon of
constitutional avoidance, the rule of lenity, and several clear
statement rules.52
In addition, numerous commentators writing over a wide
time span have maintained that judges use substantive canons
strategically, to effect judicial policy preferences at the expense
of legislative intent.53 Speaking broadly about both substantive
and language canons, British jurisprude Sir Frederick Pollock
complained more than a century ago that canons “cannot well be
accounted for except on the theory that Parliament generally
changes the law for the worse, and that the business of the judges
is to keep the mischief of its interference within the narrowest
possible bounds.”54 More recently, Eskridge has argued that
Scalia used substantive canons selectively and arbitrarily, and
in a manner that was less constraining than interpretive approaches that consider legislative history and intent.55
Scalia himself characterized at least some substantive canons as “a sheer judicial power-grab”56 and called all substantive

49

Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1).
Id at 125–26.
51 Frost, 59 UCLA L Rev at 929 (cited in note 42).
52 Barrett, 90 BU L Rev at 121–23 (cited in note 3).
53 See, for example, Ross, 45 Vand L Rev at 563 (cited in note 27) (arguing that
substantive canons “clearly reflect judicial, not congressional, policy concerns”); Edward
L. Rubin, Modern Statutes, Loose Canons, and the Limits of Practical Reason: A Response to Farber and Ross, 45 Vand L Rev 579, 590 (1992).
54 Frederick Pollock, Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics 85 (Macmillan 1882). See
also James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation”, 43 Harv L Rev 886, 890–91
(1930) (criticizing the use of the canons of interpretation over legislative history).
55 See Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 676 (cited in note 7).
56 Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 29 (cited in note 2).
50
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canons “a lot of trouble” to “the honest textualist.”57 He described substantive canons as “indeterminate,” leading to the
“unpredictability, if not the arbitrariness, of judicial decisions.”58 He also questioned “where the courts get the authority
to impose them,” doubting whether courts can “really just decree
that [they] will interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean
less or more than what they fairly say.”59
Commentators also seem to agree that there is tension between substantive canons and legislative history, and that as
conservative justices have come to dominate the Supreme Court,
there has been a trend toward increasing reliance on substantive canons and diminishing reliance on legislative history.
Judge Patricia Wald, for example, has observed that “legislative
history is often rejected in favor of, or at least filtered through,
canons, presumptions, or principles considered overriding by a
majority of the Court.”60 Professor Charles Tiefer similarly has
argued that textualists have “strengthen[ed] [ ] substantive canons along grounds of dispensing with legislative history.”61 More
recently, Professors James Brudney and Corey Ditslear’s study
of Supreme Court canon use in employment law cases found
that, in closely decided cases, there was a “distinctly conservative influence associated with substantive canon reliance.”62
Brudney and Ditslear identified a subset of cases in which the
majority opinion relied on canons (language or substantive),
while the dissenting opinion relied on legislative history.63 In
short, the picture painted by statutory interpretation scholars has
been of a Court dominated by conservative justices who regularly
employ substantive canons and rarely consult legislative history,
and of a liberal minority who infrequently invoke substantive
canons but continue to consult legislative history regularly.
At first blush, the prevailing scholarly wisdom seems unimpeachable. Some prominent substantive canons blatantly
are designed to contravene congressional intent, or at least to
57

Id at 28.
Id (“[I]t is virtually impossible to expect uniformity and objectivity when there is
added, on one or the other side of the balance, a thumb of indeterminate weight.”).
59 Id at 28–29.
60 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L Rev 195, 207 (1983) (emphasis added).
61 Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 Wis L Rev 205, 220 (emphasis added).
62 Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 6 (cited in note 26).
63 See id at 77–79. For a fuller discussion of their findings, see Part I.B.
58
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impose default rules that penalize Congress for imprecise drafting. The rule of lenity, for example, dictates that doubts about
whether particular conduct is covered by a criminal statute
should be resolved in favor of criminal defendants, even though
members of Congress tend to take a “tough on crime” stance and
likely would prefer to resolve such close calls in favor of the government.64 Similarly, federalism clear statement rules impose a
default rule that preserves state power at the expense of federal
power, deliberately setting a high bar for congressional efforts to
intrude on state rights—even though members of Congress
would likely prefer that such doubts be resolved in favor of the
federal rule.65 But despite the intent-defeating design of some
substantive canons, doctrinal analysis of the cases studied in
this Article suggests that substantive canons often are used in
tandem with, or to further, legislative intent, rather than to
frustrate it.66
B.

Prior Studies

There is only one study to date that has examined the substantive canons as a set, rather than focusing on one or a handful of specific such canons. That study, published in 1992 by
Eskridge and Professor Philip Frickey, reviewed the Supreme
Court’s substantive canon use during the last eleven years of the
Burger Court and the first five years of the Rehnquist Court.67
Eskridge and Frickey posited that, rather than deciding cases
based on what a substantive canon dictates, the Court shapes
and even invents canons to fit the results it reaches in individual
cases.68 That is, substantive canons play an important role in the
way the Court expresses or justifies the “value choices” it is employing when it construes a statute, but they do not dictate or
produce outcomes; rather, outcomes produce canons.69 As evidence in support of their view, Eskridge and Frickey reported
that a comparison of the Court’s behavior during the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts, and even during different periods within the
64

Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 957 (cited in note 25).
See id at 944 (reporting the results of a survey showing that congressional staffers
predicted that courts interpreting ambiguities in federal statutes relating to preemption
would favor the reach of federal law).
66 See Part II.C.
67 See Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 596 (cited in note 7).
68 See id.
69 Id.
65
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Burger Court, revealed “striking differences both in the canons
the Court invokes and in the way in which the canons are invoked.”70 They argued that this makes sense because, if outcomes
produce canons, we can expect that “different Courts will express
their different ideologies by emphasizing, or even creating, different substantive canons in the complex work of statutory interpretation.”71 Indeed, Eskridge and Frickey’s article focused on the
Court’s creation of several new federalism-protecting clear statement rules during the 1980s.72 Specifically, they observed that
“[t]he Court not only created new canons reflecting federalismbased values, but also transformed some of the existing clear
statement rules into super-strong clear statement rules.”73 And
they took this invention and reinvention of substantive canons
to be par for the course, rather than a development unique to
the federalism clear statement rules or to the particular period
they studied.74
In a later article, Eskridge further observed that during the
period between 1987 and 1994, the Rehnquist Court employed
“no fewer than seventy-nine different” substantive canons in
statutory cases.75 He also pointed out that “Scalia joined or wrote
the Court’s opinion in almost all of the cases where the Court invoked or revised these substantive canons.”76 As Part II elaborates, I found considerably less variety in the number of substantive canons employed by the Roberts Court between 2006
and 2012 and low rates of substantive canon reliance in the
opinions authored by Scalia.77
Although not focused on substantive canons, Brudney and
Ditslear’s study of the Supreme Court’s workplace law cases also
provides some important background for this Article. In particular,
70

Id.
Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 596 (cited in note 7).
72 The article is best known for its elaboration of the quasi-constitutional nature of
these federalism clear statement rules and for the authors’ normative critique of such
rules. See id at 619–29, 640–45.
73 Id at 619.
74 See id at 596 (asserting that the substantive canons are “constructed, and reconstructed, over time”).
75 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2), citing William N.
Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 101–08 (1994).
76 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added).
77 See Parts II.B.1–2. Similarly, Scalia joined a majority (fifty of eighty-seven), but
nowhere near all, of the opinions in which the Court invoked a substantive canon. See
Table 4.
71
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the Brudney-Ditslear study reinforces several prevailing assumptions about the relationship among substantive canons,
ideology, and congressional intent. As noted above, Brudney and
Ditslear identified a subset of 10 closely divided cases (out of 148
total closely divided cases) in which the majority opinion relied
on substantive canons but not legislative history, while the dissent invoked legislative history to support its position.78 In nine
of these cases, the majority opinion applied a substantive canon
to reach a conservative result, while the dissenting opinion relied on legislative history to reach a liberal result.79 Based on
these and related findings, Brudney and Ditslear concluded that
“this polarized pattern suggests that for an identifiable subset of
divisive cases, the canons are being used by the Rehnquist Court
to help produce a judicially desired set of policies, ignoring or
sacrificing legislatively expressed preferences in the process.”80
Although Brudney and Ditslear’s study involved a relatively
small number of cases, the conclusions Brudney and Ditslear
drew are consistent with prevailing views that substantive canons operate to undermine congressional intent. As discussed in
Part II, my study of the Roberts Court suggests that these conclusions may be overstated and that, at least in some cases, the
Court seeks to use substantive canons to honor congressional
intent.
Both the Eskridge-Frickey and the Brudney-Ditslear studies
appear to have assumed that when substantive canons were invoked, they played a meaningful role in the Court’s statutory
constructions. The evidence reported in the next Part provides
some reason to question that assumption and affords a more
complete picture of how individual justices compare in their use
of substantive canons.
II. THE DATA
A.

Methodology

The findings and conclusions presented below are based on
quantitative and qualitative analysis of all decisions in the
Roberts Court’s 2005 (post–January 31, 200681) through 2011
78
79
80
81

Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 53, 78–79 (cited in note 26).
See id at 78–79.
Id at 79.
This is the date that Justice Alito joined the Court.
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terms that confronted a question of statutory interpretation.82
Every case decided during that period was examined through
the Supreme Court’s online database to determine whether it
dealt with a statutory issue.83 Any case in which the Court’s opinion contained a substantial discussion about statutory meaning
was included in the study. Cases interpreting the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure (FRCP), the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE),
or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) were not included,84 but a handful of constitutional cases in which the Court
construed the meaning of a federal statute before deciding the
constitutional question were included.85 This selection methodology yielded 296 statutory cases over six and a half terms, with
296 majority or plurality opinions, 115 concurring opinions, 172
dissenting opinions, 18 part-concurring/part-dissenting opinions,
and 2 part-majority/part-concurring opinions, for a total of 603
opinions. Of these 296 cases, 138 cases were decided unanimously,
and 158 were decided by a divided vote.86

82 This time period was not chosen for any particular reason; the time-intensive
nature of data collection led to a decision to end with the 2011 term.
83 For most cases, this process consisted of examining the syllabus for the case; in a
few cases, the entire case was read.
84 I made this judgment call because the FRCP, FRE, and FRCrP are created in a
manner that differs significantly from federal statutes—they are drafted by judges rather
than Congress and do not require the president’s approval. See 28 USC § 2072(a) (granting the Supreme Court “the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
and rules of evidence for cases” in federal courts); How the Rulemaking Process Works:
Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public (Administrative Office of the US Courts), archived at http://perma.cc/DEB3-7QT6 (explaining the current process for amending the
federal rules). Accordingly, several of the interpretive tools available when construing
statutes—for example, legislative history, intent, the whole-act rule, and other statutes—are not available with respect to the federal rules or provide a very different kind
of context, from a very different perspective, when used to construe the federal rules.
85 In such cases, the opinion was coded as unanimous, close margin, or wide margin
based on the justices’ votes regarding the statutory interpretation question only; thus, if
the justices agreed unanimously that the statute should be read to mean X, but then
split 5–4 regarding the constitutional validity of the statute, the opinion was coded as
unanimous. See generally, for example, Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District
Number One v Holder, 557 US 193 (2009) (holding unanimously, on statutory grounds,
that all political subdivisions are entitled to seek relief from their preclearance obligations under the Voting Rights Act, while also deciding, by a vote of 8–1, to employ the
canon of constitutional avoidance to refrain from determining the constitutionality of a
section of that act).
86 This figure counts as unanimous all decisions in which there was no dissenting
opinion, even if concurring opinions offering different rationales were issued. By comparison, for the 2006 through 2011 terms, the overall number of unanimously decided
cases (including both statutory and constitutional cases) was 186, and the number of
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In coding and analyzing these cases, my primary goal was to
determine the frequency with which the Court referenced different interpretive sources when giving meaning to federal statutes. The cases in the study were examined for references to the
following interpretive tools: (1) statutory text, including appeals
to plain meaning; (2) dictionary definitions; (3) grammar rules;
(4) the whole-act rule; (5) other federal and state statutes;
(6) common law; (7) substantive canons; (8) Supreme Court
precedent; (9) statutory purpose; (10) practical consequences;
(11) legislative intent; (12) legislative history; (13) language
canons such as expressio unius; and (14) references to some form
of agency deference.87
For purposes of this study, “substantive canons” were defined as background constitutional or policy norms, rules, or
presumptions about how statutes should be interpreted, including rules about how statutes in a particular subject area should
be construed. Coders were instructed to identify the specific substantive canon being invoked.88
The interpretive resources coded for in this study are consistent with those that have been examined in other empirical
studies of the Court’s statutory interpretation practices.89 A few
differences in definitions used for the different sources were inevitable and are pointed out when notable. For example, some
early empirical studies of the Supreme Court’s statutory cases
lumped language and substantive canons together under the

divided-vote cases was 278. For access to the data, see Stat Pack Archive (SCOTUSblog),
available at http://perma.cc/4T5G-8L3L.
87 In order to reduce the risk of inconsistency, I and at least one research assistant
separately read and analyzed each opinion and separately recorded the use of each interpretive resource. In the event of disagreement, I reviewed the case and made the final
determination as to how a particular interpretive resource should be coded. For a detailed explanation of my coding methodology, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62
Hastings L J 221, 291–96 (2010).
88 For a list of all cases in the data set that were identified as invoking a substantive canon and the substantive canon(s) invoked, see Appendix. For additional discussion
of the methodology and what constitutes a substantive canon, see note 148 and accompanying text.
89 See, for example, Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism
in Recent Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History
Debate and Beyond, 51 Stan L Rev 1, 11–12 (1998); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex L Rev 1073, 1088–90
(1992); Frank B. Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation 142–48
(Stanford 2009).
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heading “canons of construction,” rather than measuring references to these different forms of canons separately, as I did.90
In recording the Court’s reliance on particular interpretive
tools, I counted only references that reflected substantive judicial reliance on the tool in reaching an interpretation. When an
opinion mentioned a substantive canon but rejected it as inapplicable or not controlling,91 I did not count that as a substantive
canon reference. Similarly, I did not count instances in which
the Court merely acknowledged, but did not accept, a litigant’s
argument that a particular canon or tool dictated a particular
result.92
Secondary or corroborative references to an interpretive
tool, on the other hand, were counted; thus, when the Court
reached an interpretation based primarily on one interpretive
source but went on to note that x, y, and z interpretive tools further supported that interpretation, the references to x, y, and z
were coded along with the primarily-relied-upon source.93
In addition, the vote margin in each case was recorded, and
each case and opinion was recorded as unanimous, close margin,
or wide margin (cases with six or more justices in the majority).
Each justice’s vote in each case also was recorded, as was the
author of each opinion. This methodology was the same as that
followed in my previous empirical studies.94
The ideological direction of each opinion also was recorded.
It is difficult to code case outcomes for ideology because it is not
90

See, for example, Schacter, 51 Stan L Rev at 11–12 (cited in note 89).
See, for example, United States v Stevens, 559 US 460, 481 (2010) (declining to
apply the canon of constitutional avoidance).
92 An example may help illustrate. In Barber v Thomas, 560 US 474 (2010), the majority opinion considered whether the phrase “term of imprisonment” in a statute allowing good-time credit for good behavior by prisoners applies to the time actually served by
the prisoner, or the time the prisoner was sentenced to serve. Id at 483–84. The majority
held that the phrase referred to the time actually served; in so ruling, it rejected a rule of
lenity argument invoked by the petitioner and the dissent, concluding that the rule was
inapplicable because the statute was unambiguous. Id at 488. See also id at 500–01
(Kennedy dissenting). The opinion was not coded for reliance on a substantive canon.
93 For example, in Reynolds v United States, 132 S Ct 975 (2012), the Court held
that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act does not require pre-Act offenders (convicted before the Act took effect) to register or update their registrations before
the attorney general specifies that the Act’s registration requirements apply to them. Id
at 984. The majority opinion relied primarily on the “natural” meaning of the Act’s text,
and also mentioned the rule of lenity in a passing parenthetical. Id at 980, 982. The opinion was coded for references to text / plain meaning and substantive canons.
94 See Krishnakumar, 62 Hastings L J at 231–33 (cited in note 87); Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 Duke L J 909, 921–26 (2016).
91
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always clear whether an outcome favoring a particular litigant
is liberal or conservative, and coders necessarily must make
judgment calls. In order to minimize errors and to make this
study as replicable as possible, I coded for ideology by importing
the ideological-direction coding from Professor Harold Spaeth’s
Supreme Court Database for the cases in my data set.95
Finally, every opinion in which a substantive canon was invoked was coded as containing “passing reliance,” “some reliance,” or “primary reliance” on the substantive canon. While this
coding necessarily involved some judgment calls, I believe that it
adds valuable texture to our understanding of how the Court uses
substantive canons when it chooses to invoke them. In any
event, my data are available for others to review and agree or
disagree with.96 The coding parameters for reliance were as follows: An opinion was coded as containing “passing reliance” on a
substantive canon if it made minimal reference to the canon, or
mentioned it as a fallback or add-on argument supporting a
reading already arrived at through other interpretive tools. An
opinion was coded as involving “some reliance” on a substantive
canon if it made more than minimal reference to the canon, but
did not rely on the substantive canon as the main justification
for the construction it adopted. Finally, an opinion was coded as
containing “primary reliance” if it relied primarily on a substantive canon to justify the result reached.
A few examples should help illustrate how these judgment
calls were made. In Exxon Shipping Co v Baker,97 for instance,
the Court considered whether the Clean Water Act’s98 water pollution penalties preempt punitive damages awards in maritime
spill cases.99 The Court concluded that the Act does not preempt
punitive damages awards, based primarily on the statute’s
text.100 The Court also commented that it saw no clear indication of congressional intent to preempt such awards and made
a passing reference—in a parenthetical—to the rule that a
statute must clearly state its intent to abrogate a common-law
95 See The Supreme Court Database (Washington University Law), archived at
http://perma.cc/3DL8-4K2W.
96 See Appendix.
97 554 US 471 (2008).
98 Federal Water Pollution Acts Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86 Stat
816, codified as amended at 33 USC § 1251 et seq.
99 Exxon, 554 US at 481.
100 See id at 488–89.
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principle.101 This case was coded as containing “passing” reliance on a substantive canon. By contrast, in Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District Number One v Holder102
(“NAMUDNO”), the Supreme Court employed the avoidance
canon to adopt a strained reading of the Voting Rights Act of
1965103 (VRA)—concluding that a Texas utility district counted
as a “political subdivision” eligible for bailout from the preclearance requirement of VRA § 5—in order to avoid thorny questions
about the constitutionality of § 5’s preclearance formula.104
NAMUDNO was coded as involving “primary reliance” on a substantive canon.105 Finally, in Begay v United States,106 the Court
held that the offense of driving under the influence (DUI) does
not count as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal
Act of 1984.107 Justice Scalia agreed and authored a concurring
opinion that relied on the statutory text, the whole-act rule, and
a dictionary definition to conclude that the proper test for determining whether an offense is a “violent felony” is whether the
offense “pose[s] at least as serious a risk of physical injury to another as burglary.”108 His concurring opinion then stated that
drunk driving could not clearly be said to pose “at least as serious
a risk of physical injury to another as burglary” and that the rule
of lenity therefore required him to find in favor of the defendant.109 Scalia’s concurrence in Begay was coded as containing
“some reliance”—that is, more than “passing reliance” but less
than “primary reliance”—on a substantive canon.

101

See id at 489.
557 US 193 (2009).
103 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437, codified as amended at 52 USC § 10301 et seq.
104 NAMUDNO, 557 US at 196–97.
105 For additional examples of “primary reliance” cases, see generally Arlington Central
School District Board of Education v Murphy, 548 US 291 (2006) (using a federalism
clear statement canon to hold that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) does not allow recovery of expert fees from states); Gonzales v Carhart, 550 US
124 (2007) (using the avoidance canon to find that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
does not prohibit standard “dilation and evacuation” procedures); Florida Department of
Revenue v Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc, 554 US 33 (2008) (using a federalism clear statement canon to construe the Bankruptcy Code’s stamp tax exemption to not apply to
transactions before a plan is confirmed under Chapter 11).
106 553 US 137 (2008).
107 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 2185, codified as amended at 18 USC § 924(e). For the
Court’s holding, see Begay, 553 US at 139.
108 Begay, 553 US at 148–53 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
109 Id at 153 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
102
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Substantive Canon Statistics

Before reporting the data, it is important to note some limitations of this study. First, the study covers only six and a half
Supreme Court terms and only 296 statutory interpretation
cases, decided by some combination of the same eleven justices.
While this data set is large enough to reveal some things about
the Supreme Court’s use of substantive canons, the data reported
may reflect trends specific to the Roberts Court. Second, great
significance should not be placed on the precise percentages reported; the number of cases reviewed is large enough to provide
some valuable insights, but the focus should be on the patterns
that emerge rather than on specific percentages. Third, in noting
the weight, or intensity, of an opinion’s reliance on a substantive
canon, I make no claims to have discovered the justices’ underlying, or “true,” motivations for deciding a statutory case; the data
do not reveal whether a particular opinion relied heavily on a
substantive canon because the opinion’s author was persuaded
by the canon, or merely because the author thought the canon
was a convincing interpretive tool. The study’s empirical and
doctrinal claims are confined to describing how the justices publicly engage the substantive canons as justifications for their
statutory constructions and to theorizing about discernable patterns in their public engagement of such canons.
1. Frequency and weight.
Table 1 reports the frequency with which the members of
the Roberts Court referenced substantive canons—and other interpretive canons or tools of construction—in the opinions they
authored during the Court’s 2005 through 2011 terms.110 For
seven of the eleven justices, the rates of reference to substantive
canons are low, roughly at or below 15.0 percent.111 As Table 1
shows, this compares to much higher rates of reference, across
justices, for almost every other interpretive tool.112 Even the
three most frequent users of substantive canons, Justices John
Paul Stevens, John Roberts, and Sonia Sotomayor, employed
such canons in no more than 25.0 percent of the opinions they

110
111
112

See Table 1.
See id.
See id.
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authored.113 Indeed, out of the eleven interpretive tools listed in
Table 1, substantive canons were among the least frequently invoked. Only common law exhibited similarly low rates of reference across the board.114 While some of the justices referenced
legislative intent at low rates as well, several others invoked intent at much higher rates (above 20.0 percent).115

113

See id.
See Table 1 (reporting rates of reference for “Common Law” precedent ranging
from 0 percent to 17.6 percent). One important caveat: my study did not count references
to agency deference, such as the Chevron doctrine, as substantive canon references—
such references instead were coded as reliance on an independent interpretive resource
(agency deference). See Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc,
467 US 837, 842–43 (1984). This is consistent with how most other empirical studies of
the US Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation practices have treated references to
agency deference. See, for example, Schacter, 51 Stan L Rev at 33–34 (cited in note 89)
(coding judicial invocations of “Chevron-style deference” as references to “administrative
materials”); Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation at 144 (cited in
note 89) (coding reliance on Chevron doctrine as a form of “deference to the executive
branch”); Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 23–24 (cited in note 26) (coding “agency
deference” separately from “substantive canons”). But see Connor N. Raso and William N.
Eskridge Jr, Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 Colum L Rev 1727, 1734–35 (2010) (calling
agency deference doctrines a form of substantive canon); Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L
Rev at 940 (cited in note 25). My study also did not count citations to the canon against
implied repeals or the rule that specific provisions trump general ones as substantive
canons because legislation scholars consider these to be textual integrity or whole-code
canons. See, for example, William N. Eskridge Jr, John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School, E-mail to Anita S. Krishnakumar (Oct 30, 2015) (“Eskridge
E-mail”) (on file with author).
115 See Table 1.
114
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TABLE 1. RATES OF RELIANCE ON INTERPRETIVE CANONS AND
TOOLS BY OPINION AUTHOR
(N=584)
Canons /
Interpretive
Tools

Thomas Scalia Alito Roberts Kennedy Breyer
(n=77) (n=82) (n=58) (n=41) (n=46) (n=80)

Kagan
(n=14)

Souter Ginsburg Sotomayor Stevens
(n=35) (n=57)
(n=34)
(n=60)

Supreme
Court
Precedent

54.5%

40.2%

43.1%

58.5%

60.9%

50.0%

42.9%

54.3%

47.4%

70.6%

55.0%

Text / Plain
Meaning*

62.3%

56.1%

48.3%

48.8%

47.8%

26.3%

57.1%

45.7%

28.1%

47.1%

43.3%

Dictionary
Rule

24.7%

19.5%

29.3%

14.6%

26.1%

15.0%

35.7%

17.1%

14.0%

26.5%

16.7%

Combined
Language
Canons /
Whole-Act
Rule

42.9%

28.0%

36.2%

51.2%

30.4%

18.8%

50.0%

31.4%

29.8%

52.9%

25.0%

Other
Statutes

16.9%

23.2%

31.0%

26.8%

21.7%

18.8%

7.1%

22.9%

22.8%

26.5%

16.7%

Common Law

9.0%

14.6%

17.2%

17.1%

4.3%

8.8%

0.0%

14.3%

5.3%

17.6%

16.7%

Substantive
Canons

11.7%

11.0%

13.8%

22.0%

15.2%

11.3%

14.3%

14.3%

15.8%

17.6%

25.0%

Practical
Consequences*

16.9%

30.5%

37.9%

31.7%

45.7%

43.8%

21.4%

31.4%

42.1%

44.1%

30.0%

Purpose*

14.3%

11.0%

22.4%

12.2%

45.7%

41.3%

50.0%

17.1%

33.3%

38.2%

30.0%

Intent*

5.2%

4.9%

17.2%

7.3%

6.5%

21.3%

14.3%

22.9%

21.1%

26.5%

41.7%

Legislative
History*

7.8%

9.8%

20.7%

12.2%

26.1%

43.8%

28.6%

28.6%

29.8%

52.9%

38.3%


Percentages reported in each row represent the number of opinions authored by
each justice that invoked the listed interpretive canon, divided by the total number of
statutory interpretation opinions each justice authored (that total number is reported
below each justice’s name, as n=X).

The total number of opinions reflected in the Table is 584, rather than 603, because the Table omits 19 per curiam opinions issued during the period studied.
*
Indicates that a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test, using the Bonferroni
multiple comparison method, reveals a significant difference between rates of reliance by
different justices in the opinions they authored at p < 0.05. (For Text / Plain Meaning
p=0.000; for Practical Consequences p=0.0091; for Purpose p=0.000; for Intent p=0.000;
and for Legislative History p=0.0001.) In other words, for these particular interpretive
tools, the patterns or differences in rates of reference across justices were less than 5.0
percent likely to have occurred merely by chance.
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Table 2 provides a slightly different comparison of the rates
at which the members of the Roberts Court referenced substantive canons, relative to other interpretive tools, as a percentage
of all opinions issued during the period studied.
TABLE 2. OVERALL ROBERTS COURT RATES OF RELIANCE ON
INTERPRETIVE CANONS AND TOOLS:
2005–2011 TERMS
All
Opinions†
(n=603)

Majority
Opinions
(n=296)

Dissenting
Opinions
(n=172)

Concurring
Opinions
(n=115)

Partial
Opinions
(n=20)

Supreme Court
Precedent

52.6%

62.5%

48.3%

36.5%

35.0%

Text / Plain Meaning

44.8%

54.1%

39.0%

33.0%

25.0%

Dictionary Rule

19.9%

27.7%

14.5%

8.7%

15.0%

Combined Language
Canons /
Whole-Act Rule

32.3%

67.9%

25.0%

12.2%

25.0%

Other Statutes

21.2%

33.4%

20.3%

5.2%

5.0%

Common Law

11.4%

15.2%

6.4%

8.7%

15.0%

Substantive Canons

14.4%

15.5%

18.0%

5.2%

5.0%

Practical
Consequences

33.7%

34.5%

44.2%

19.1%

15.0%

Purpose

26.0%

28.0%

32.0%

12.2%

25.0%

Intent

16.1%

15.2%

24.4%

7.8%

5.0%

Legislative History

25.0%

27.0%

30.8%

10.4%

30.0%

Canons /
Interpretive Tools

Like the data in Table 1, the data in Table 2 reveal that
substantive canons were infrequently invoked in the Court’s
statutory cases (14.4 percent of all opinions). Also as in Table 1,
substantive canons were the Court’s second-least-frequentlyused interpretive resource overall, behind only the common
law.116 This raw rate is not shocking in itself; Professors Brudney
and Ditslear’s study of workplace law cases found similarly low
† The percentages reported in each column represent the number of cases that referenced an interpretive tool divided by the total number of opinions of that type (majority,
dissenting, etc.) authored in cases presenting a statutory interpretation question. Per
curiam opinions, which were excluded from Table 1, are counted as majority opinions
for the purposes of this Table.
116 See Table 2. Common-law precedent was referenced in 11.4 percent of all opinions.
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overall rates of reference to substantive canons (15.6 percent of
Rehnquist Court cases).117 What is new is the finding that such
low rates of reference hold true across all statutory subject areas—
not just in cases involving employment law statutes—and the
comparative data indicating that the Court invoked substantive
canons far less often than it invoked almost all other interpretive canons and tools.
More striking, however, is what the data show about how
infrequently textualist justices employed substantive canons in
the statutory opinions they authored. Contrary to popular belief,
the Court’s most prominent textualist, Scalia, referenced substantive canons in only 11.0 percent (nine of eighty-two) of the
opinions he authored, and fellow textualist Justice Thomas did
so in just 11.7 percent (nine of seventy-seven) of the opinions
that he authored.118 Textualist-leaning Justice Alito119 exhibited
similarly low rates of reference.120 Equally surprising is that the
three most frequent users of substantive canons turned out to be
Stevens, Roberts, and Sotomayor.121 This is unexpected, and
turns the conventional wisdom about substantive canons on its
head, because Stevens and Sotomayor are intentionalists, who
regularly use legislative history to inform their statutory constructions—not textualist judges forced to turn to substantive
canons to provide the context they lack because they refuse to
consult legislative history.122 Part III discusses the implications
of these findings in detail.
The data also reveal some surprising information about the
weight that the justices placed on substantive canons when they
did invoke them. Table 3 reports how often the members of the
Roberts Court placed “passing,” “some,” or “primary” reliance on
substantive canons in the opinions in which they employed such
canons.

117

See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26).
See Table 1.
119 See Smith, 108 Colum L Rev at 1887 & n 14 (cited in note 12).
120 See Table 1 (reporting a rate of 13.8 percent).
121 See id (reporting rates of reference of 25.0 percent, 22.0 percent, and 17.6 percent, respectively).
122 See Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1545 (cited in note 2) (“[A] textualism refusing to consider the legislative context of statutes is going to be tempted . . . to
rely on substantive canons.”); Frost, 59 UCLA L Rev at 929 (cited in note 42)
(“[T]extualist judges are particularly fond of clear statement rules, which aid them in
interpreting ambiguous statutes without the need to resort to legislative history.”).
118
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TABLE 3. RELATIVE WEIGHT PLACED ON SUBSTANTIVE CANONS
Passing Reliance
(n=34)

Some Reliance
(n=28)

Primary Reliance
(n=25)

All Opinions
That Reference
Substantive Canons (n=87)

39.1%
(34)

32.2%
(28)

28.7%
(25)

Majority Opinions
(n=49)

30.6%
(15)

32.7%
(16)

36.7%
(18)

Concurring
Opinions
(n=6)

50.0%
(3)

16.7%
(1)

33.3%
(2)

Dissenting
Opinions
(n=31)

51.6%
(16)

35.5%
(11)

12.9%
(4)

Partial
Opinions
(n=1)

0.0%
(0)

0.0%
(0)

100.0%
(1)

Notably, the data show that the justices placed only “passing” or “some” reliance on substantive canons in 71.3 percent of
the opinions that invoked such canons.123 Many of these opinions
mentioned substantive canons only at the tail end, in a fleeting,
throwaway fashion or as an alternative, “even if,” argument.124
Others employed substantive canons as a secondary resource or

123 See Table 3 (demonstrating that sixty-two of the eighty-seven opinions that invoked a substantive canon did so in a passing or secondary manner).
124 See, for example, United States v Santos, 553 US 507, 528 (2008) (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (noting, in the last few sentences of the opinion, that “[t]his
conclusion dovetails with what common sense and the rule of lenity would require”). For
similar usages, see Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc,
556 US 502, 565–67 (2009) (Breyer dissenting); CBOCS West, Inc v Humphries, 553 US
442, 463 (2008) (Thomas dissenting); Hall Street Associates, LLC v Mattel, Inc, 552 US 576,
595 (2008) (Stevens dissenting); Dean v United States, 556 US 568, 581 (2009) (Stevens
dissenting); Carachuri-Rosendo v Holder, 560 US 563, 581 (2010); Bilski v Kappos, 561
US 593, 645 (2010) (Stevens concurring in the judgment); Carr v United States, 560 US
438, 450 n 6 (2010); Fowler v United States, 563 US 668, 675–76 (2011); Kucana v Holder,
558 US 233, 251 (2010); Exxon, 554 US at 489; Ali v Federal Bureau of Prisons, 552 US
214, 247 (2008) (Breyer dissenting); BP America Production Co v Burton, 549 US 84, 95–
96 (2006); Bruesewitz v Wyeth LLC, 562 US 223, 267 n 15 (2011) (Sotomayor dissenting);
James v United States, 550 US 192, 219 (2007) (Scalia dissenting). The substantive canons used in each of these cases are listed in the Appendix.
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interpretive aid.125 Ultimately, less than 30.0 percent of the
substantive canon–invoking opinions in the data set relied
“primarily,” or in a dispositive manner, on such canons.126 Thus,
125 See Table 3 (middle column). See also, for example, Knight v Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 552 US 181, 192–95 (2008) (invoking, inter alia, a canon that the trustee has the burden of establishing a trust’s entitlement to a tax deduction and holding
that the trustee had not met that burden). For similar usages, see Altria Group, Inc v
Good, 555 US 70, 77–80 (2008); Bartlett v Strickland, 556 US 1, 21–23 (2009) (Kennedy)
(plurality); Hawaii v Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 US 163, 176 (2009); Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America v Whiting, 563 US 582, 594–600 (2011);
Hamilton v Lanning, 560 US 505, 517 (2010); Hardt v Reliance Standard Life Insurance
Co, 560 US 242, 252–56 (2010); Office of Senator Mark Dayton v Hanson, 550 US 511,
514 (2007); Gonzalez v Thaler, 132 S Ct 641, 648–50 (2012); Howard Delivery Service, Inc
v Zurich American Insurance Co, 547 US 651, 667–68 (2006); id at 669–70 (Kennedy dissenting); Microsoft Corp v AT&T Corp, 550 US 437, 454–56 (2007); PLIVA, Inc v Mensing,
564 US 604, 621–23 (2011) (Thomas) (plurality); id at 634–38 (Sotomayor dissenting);
Smith v Bayer Corp, 564 US 299, 306 (2011); Travelers Casualty & Surety Co of America
v Pacific Gas & Electric Co, 549 US 443, 452–55 (2007); Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555, 565
(2009); Begay, 553 US at 153–54 (Scalia concurring in the judgment); Barber, 560 US at
500–01 (Kennedy dissenting); Dean, 556 US at 584–86 (Breyer dissenting); Jerman v
Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, LPA, 559 US 573, 623 (2010) (Kennedy dissenting); Kawashima v Holder, 132 S Ct 1166, 1177 (2012) (Ginsburg dissenting); Riegel
v Medtronic, Inc, 552 US 312, 334–35 (2008) (Ginsburg dissenting); Riley v Kennedy, 553
US 406, 430 (2008) (Stevens dissenting); United States v Rodriquez, 553 US 377, 404–05
(2008) (Souter dissenting); Vartelas v Holder, 132 S Ct 1479, 1494–96 (2012) (Scalia dissenting); Watters v Wachovia Bank, NA, 550 US 1, 32 (2007) (Stevens dissenting); Brown
v Plata, 563 US 493, 531–33 (2011). The substantive canons used in each of these cases
are listed in the Appendix.
126 See Table 3 (right column). See also, for example, Arlington Central, 548 US at
296–300 (beginning the analysis by invoking the rule that “when Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds, the conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously,’” and finding that expert fees are not covered by the IDEA because the statute
does not put the states on clear notice that they might be liable for such fees). For similar
usages, see Mims v Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 132 S Ct 740, 748–49 (2012); Federal
Aviation Administration v Cooper, 132 S Ct 1441, 1453 (2012); Arizona v United States,
132 S Ct 2492, 2524–25 (2012) (Alito concurring in part and dissenting in part); National
Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 132 S Ct 2566, 2594, 2607 (2012) (“NFIB”);
Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency, 132 S Ct 1367, 1373 (2012); Vartelas, 132 S Ct
at 1484; CompuCredit Corp v Greenwood, 132 S Ct 665, 675 (2012) (Sotomayor concurring in the judgment); Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v
Roche Molecular Systems, Inc, 563 US 776, 785–86 (2011); id at 802–03 (Breyer dissenting); Holland v Florida, 560 US 631, 645–46 (2010); Skilling v United States, 561 US
358, 403, 410 (2010); Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 558 US 310, 405–
08 (2010) (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part); Holder v Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 US 1, 56 (2010) (Breyer dissenting); Felkner v Jackson, 562 US 594,
598 (2011) (per curiam); Fernandez-Vargas v Gonzales, 548 US 30, 37 (2006); Morrison
v National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247, 255 (2010); NAMUDNO, 557 US at 203–05;
Santos, 553 US at 514; Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723, 806 (2008) (Roberts dissenting);
Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554 US at 50; Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations v City
of New York, 551 US 193, 202–03 (2007) (Stevens dissenting); eBay Inc v MercExchange,
LLC, 547 US 388, 391 (2006); id at 395 (Roberts concurring); Carhart, 550 US at 153–54.
The substantive canons used in each of these cases are listed in the Appendix.
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it seems that not only are substantive canons infrequently invoked, but even when invoked, they are used only to reinforce
other considerations in the vast majority of cases.127
Finally, the data show that the modern Court is not invoking
substantive canons at dramatically higher rates than legislative
history, as some scholars have speculated. On the contrary, eight
of the eleven justices who served on the Roberts Court during
the period studied—including conservative, textualist-leaning
Alito and Justice Anthony Kennedy—invoked legislative history
more frequently than they invoked substantive canons, and
Scalia invoked these two interpretive resources at almost equal
rates.128
Moreover, if we compare my data to Brudney and
Ditslear’s data from the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, we see
that although legislative history use declined significantly from
the Burger Court (46.6 percent) to the Rehnquist (27.7 percent)
and Roberts (25.0 percent) Courts—as the conventional account
holds—legislative history use has not been replaced by substantive canon use.129 Substantive canon use is slightly higher on the
Roberts Court (14.4 percent) than on the Burger Court (8.3 percent)—but has declined slightly since the Rehnquist Court (15.6
percent).130 Further, legislative history use on the Roberts Court
(25.0 percent) remains substantially higher, overall, than does
substantive canon use (14.4 percent).131
Overall, these data call into question scholarly assumptions that, as the Court has grown more conservative in recent
years, it has moved toward frequent reliance on substantive
canons at the expense of legislative history.132 Indeed, I found
only 4 conservative-outcome divided-vote cases (out of 158 dividedvote cases and 60 closely divided cases in the data set) in which
the majority opinion invoked a substantive canon but not legislative history, while the dissenting opinion referenced legislative
history.133 Recall that Brudney and Ditslear found 9 cases fitting
127

See Table 3.
See Table 1. In the eighty-two opinions Scalia authored, he employed substantive
canons nine times and legislative history eight times.
129 Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26).
130 Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26).
131 See Table 2.
132 See text accompanying notes 60–63.
133 See generally Arlington Central, 548 US 291 (5–1–3); Rapanos v United States,
547 US 715 (2006) (4–1–4); Chamber of Commerce, 563 US 582 (5–3); Sossamon v Texas,
563 US 277 (2011) (6–2).
128
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this pattern, out of 148 closely divided cases total.134 Brudney
and Ditslear interpreted this subset of cases to represent a disturbing snapshot of how the Court uses substantive canons to
effect judicially desired policies at the expense of clearly expressed legislative preferences.135 I view the (smaller) subset of
similar cases in my data set differently—that is, as evidence
that substantive canons rarely are employed instead of, or to
contradict, legislative history. In other words, while it may be
true that the Court’s use of legislative history has declined since
the Burger Court era,136 its reliance on legislative history as an
interpretive resource has not been replaced, in most cases, with
reliance on substantive canons.
2. A handful of canons.
As discussed earlier, Professors Eskridge and Frickey’s prior
study of substantive canon use by the Burger and early
Rehnquist Courts posited that we should expect to see wide differences in the specific substantive canons employed by different
Courts, or even different iterations of the same Court—and that
the cases they studied revealed such differences.137 Eskridge also
suggested that the universe of substantive canons is vast and
evolving, noting that, in the period from 1987 to 1994, the Court
invoked “no fewer than seventy-nine” different substantive canons, many of them new or substantially modified canons.138 Other
scholars have argued that there are “too many” of certain types
of substantive canons, and that the variety of such canons
makes it “difficult . . . to predict the courts’ interpretive path.”139
But the data from the Roberts Court’s first six and a half
terms call into doubt this conventional account. Out of 296 statutory cases, and 87 opinions that invoked a substantive canon, I
found only 4 instances in which the justices arguably could be

134

See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 53, 68, 78–79 (cited in note 26).
See id at 79.
136 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
Wash U L Q 351, 355–57 (1994) (describing the decline in the Supreme Court’s use of
legislative history between 1981 and 1992); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 Harv
J Legis 369, 384–87 (1999) (reporting a decline in the Court’s citations of legislative history during the period from 1980 to 1998).
137 Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 596 (cited in note 7).
138 Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2).
139 See, for example, Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 945–46 (cited in note 25).
135
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said to have created a “new” substantive canon or to have modified an existing one.140 Nor was there significant variety in the
canons the justices invoked; most opinions referenced one of just
six well-established canons—the avoidance canon (sixteen), the
rule of lenity (eleven), the presumption against preemption
(eight), a federalism clear statement rule (six), the presumption
against retroactivity (five), or the narrow construction of waivers
of sovereign immunity (four).141 Overall, forty-eight of the eightyseven (55.2 percent) Roberts Court opinions that invoked a substantive canon employed one of just a handful of canons.142 The
remaining opinions referenced thirty-three other canons—
meaning that in the period between 2006 and 2012, the Court
employed only thirty-nine different substantive canons, total.143
Even if we disaggregate the federalism clear statement rules and
count each one separately, the total number would come to only
forty-four different canons.144 This is a far cry from the seventynine substantive canons that Eskridge and Frickey recorded
during the Court’s 1987 through 1994 terms.145
There could be many reasons for these stark differences in
the variety of canons invoked over different time periods. Notably, the Court’s docket has shrunk over the years, so the
number of statutory cases decided likely was larger during the
period of Eskridge and Frickey’s study.146 In addition, the
140 These cases are Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 548 US 557, 602 (2006) (Stevens) (plurality)
(establishing a new rule requiring a clear statement before the common law of war can
make offenses not defined by statute triable by military commission); Gonzalez, 132 S Ct
at 648–49 (Sotomayor) (articulating the canon that “[a] rule is jurisdictional ‘if the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional,’” and citing only a previous Roberts Court case, Arbaugh v Y & H Corp, 546
US 500 (2006), for support) (brackets omitted); NAMUDNO, 557 US at 203 (Roberts)
(holding that the equal state sovereignty principle requires a showing that any “disparate geographic coverage” in a statute “is sufficiently related to the problem that [the
statute] targets”); and Stanford, 563 US at 795 (Breyer dissenting) (articulating “a background norm that . . . denies [ ] inventors patent rights growing out of research for which
the public has already paid”). Notably, three of these four “new canon” inventions came
from intentionalist, rather than textualist, justices.
141 See Appendix.
142 These numbers reflect one overlap; the majority opinion in Skilling invoked both
the avoidance canon and the rule of lenity. See Skilling, 561 US at 403, 410.
143 See Appendix. Two avoidance canon opinions also invoked other canons; these
were included in the thirty-three-figure total.
144 See id.
145 See Eskridge, Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 2), citing
Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at 101–08 (cited in note 75).
146 The Roberts Court has heard roughly eighty cases per term since 2006. See Stat
Pack Archive (cited in note 86). By contrast, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts heard
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Court’s composition stayed conservative over the entire period
from 1994 to 2012, so the Roberts Court may have been closer,
ideologically, to the Rehnquist Court than the Rehnquist Court
was to the Burger Court. As a result, the Roberts Court may
have found less need to create new canons or to reinvent canons
created by the Rehnquist Court in order to reach its preferred
results. Alternately, perhaps the Roberts Court is inherently
more cautious than was the Rehnquist Court.147
Another possibility is that Eskridge and Frickey may have
defined what constitutes a substantive canon more broadly than
I did. At a theoretical level, there does not seem to be much difference between Eskridge and Frickey’s conception of what constitutes a substantive canon and mine—we agree that such canons establish rules or presumptions of statutory construction
that are based on substantive policy norms derived from the
Constitution, common law, or general Anglo-American legal traditions.148 In practice, however, they may have been more capacious in what they counted as a substantive canon. One crude
way to test this possibility is to compare the list of substantive

roughly 150 cases per term. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 Colum L Rev 1093, 1100 (1987); Thomas E. Baker and Douglas D.
McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 Harv L Rev 1400, 1400–01 (1987).
147 During his confirmation hearings, Roberts famously likened the role of a Supreme
Court justice to that of a baseball umpire, whose job is “to call balls and strikes, and not
to pitch or bat.” Chief Justice Roberts Statement - Nomination Process (Administrative
Office of the US Courts), archived at http://perma.cc/FZH3-7AVK. He is rumored, moreover, to have voted with the liberal members of the Court to uphold the Affordable Care
Act in NFIB in order to preserve the institutional legitimacy of the Court. See, for example, Tonja Jacobi, Obamacare as a Window on Judicial Strategy, 80 Tenn L Rev 763, 769
(2013) (arguing that Roberts’s “driving concern” in NFIB “was credibility—the institutional legitimacy of the Court, and his own reputation and legacy”); David L. Franklin,
Why Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court. (Slate, June 28, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/76LR-CNQ6 (suggesting that “the court’s very legitimacy” was at stake
and that Roberts ruled the way he did “to save the court”). Thus, his jurisprudential philosophy may be one that lends itself more to the use of existing interpretive resources
than to the creation of new canons.
148 Compare Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 595 (cited in note 7) (describing substantive canons as “the clear statement rules or presumptions of statutory interpretation that reflect substantive values drawn from the common law, federal statutes,
or the United States Constitution”) (citation omitted), with Krishnakumar, 62 Hastings
L J at 240 (cited in note 87) (defining substantive canons as “interpretive presumptions
and rules based on background legal norms, policies, and conventions,” and noting that
“[t]hey derive primarily from the common law, the Constitution, and legal tradition”).
See also Eskridge E-mail (cited in note 114) (explaining that the Eskridge and Frickey
study defined substantive canons as “explicitly substantive norm based default rule[s]”).
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canons provided in the appendix to Eskridge and Frickey’s statutory interpretation casebook with the list of substantive canons
identified in this study.149 Such a comparison reveals that
Eskridge and Frickey identified eight substantive canons from
the 2005–2011 terms that my study did not count as substantive
canons.150 This crude comparison suggests that Eskridge and
Frickey were, indeed, somewhat more generous in their determinations of what counts as a substantive canon. But it is uncertain whether such definitional or coding differences account
for the entire gap between Eskridge and Frickey’s findings of extensive substantive canon use and my more modest findings. Indeed, even if we add these eight canons to the list compiled in
my Appendix, the total number of different canons invoked during the 2005 through 2011 terms would come to fifty-two—still a
long way from the seventy-nine different canons identified by
Eskridge in his earlier study.151
Ultimately, it is unclear which of the two studies captures
the norm regarding the Court’s use of substantive canons across
time, or if either one does—it is possible that both studies are
anomalies or sui generis. Either way, the differences in the variety of substantive canons invoked by the Roberts versus
Rehnquist and Burger Courts—and especially the Roberts
Court’s lack of new substantive canon creation—are intriguing.
Moreover, whatever the reason for the differences between the
two periods studied, it is undeniable that the Roberts Court has
been surprisingly predictable, as well as somewhat restrained,
149 Compare Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at
1203–15 (cited in note 1), with Appendix.
150 The cases these canons were employed in are National Meat Association v Harris,
132 S Ct 965 (2012) (holding that the presumption against preemption does not apply if
clear language or purpose allows preemption); Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon, 548 US 331
(2006) (construing the Vienna Convention, not a statute); Wallace v Kato, 549 US 384
(2007) (implying that Congress borrows state statutes of limitations for federal statutory
schemes; coded in my study as a rule about when other statutes should be invoked);
Safeco Insurance Co of America v Burr, 551 US 47 (2007) (holding that the willfulness
requirement in civil sanction cases typically includes reckless conduct; coded in my study
as invoking the common law and Supreme Court precedent); Samantar v Yousuf, 560 US
305 (2010) (assuming that Congress considers the legitimate sovereign interests of other
nations when writing American laws); Richlin Security Service Co v Chertoff, 553 US 571
(2008) (refusing to apply a presumption against waivers of US sovereign immunity);
Hardy v Cross, 132 S Ct 490 (2011) (per curiam) (“[I]f the state-court decision was reasonable, it cannot be disturbed.”); Rehberg v Paulk, 132 S Ct 1497 (2012) (indicating
that, in evaluating official immunity, courts look to the immunities that officials historically received at common law; coded in my study as reliance on common law).
151 See text accompanying notes 137–38.
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with respect to the universe of substantive canons it has invoked: again, just six well-established canons account for more
than half of the Court’s total substantive canon references.152
These data contradict the conventional view that there are “too
many” substantive canons and that their ubiquity makes it difficult to predict the courts’ interpretive path.153
3. Ideology.
As noted in Part I, many commentators have argued that
judges use substantive canons strategically, to achieve outcomes
that accord with their policy preferences. Brudney and Ditslear’s
study of workplace law cases reinforced this view, finding that
liberal justices tend to use canons (both language and substantive) to reach liberal outcomes, while conservative justices use
canons to reach conservative outcomes.154 The data from the
Roberts Court’s first six and a half terms are only partly consistent with these findings. Table 4 reports the ideological direction for each justice for every opinion he or she authored or
joined that referenced a substantive canon.155 As Table 4 shows,
all of the liberal justices employed substantive canons to support
liberal outcomes at far higher rates than they employed such canons to support conservative outcomes.156 However, four of the five
conservative justices—Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, and Kennedy—
employed substantive canons to reach liberal results in almost
the same number of cases as they used substantive canons to
reach conservative results.157

152

See text accompanying notes 141–42.
See, for example, Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 945–46 (cited in note 25)
(suggesting that there are “too many” clear statement rules).
154 See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 57–60 (cited in note 26).
155 See Table 4. Dissenting opinions are coded for their ideology, just as majority
opinions are. So, for example, if a majority opinion reaches a liberal outcome, the dissenting opinion will be coded as reaching a conservative outcome, and any substantive canons used in the dissenting opinion will be coded as supporting a conservative
outcome.
156 See id.
157 See id.
153
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TABLE 4. IDEOLOGY BY JUSTICE IN OPINIONS AUTHORED OR
JOINED INVOKING SUBSTANTIVE CANONS
(N=87)
Justice
Ideology

% Conservative

% Liberal

% Neither

Cons–Lib
Difference

Thomas
(n=46)

Conservative

50.0% (23)

47.8% (22)

2.2% (1)

2.2%

Scalia
(n=50)

Conservative

50.0% (25)

46.0% (23)

4.0% (2)

4.0%

Alito
(n=41)

Conservative

63.4% (26)

34.1% (14)

2.4% (1)

29.3%

Roberts
(n=44)

Conservative

43.2% (19)

54.5% (24)

2.3% (1)

–11.3%

Kennedy
(n=51)

Conservative

45.1% (23)

52.9% (27)

2.0% (1)

–7.8%

Breyer
(n=45)

Liberal

28.9% (13)

66.7% (30)

4.4% (2)

–37.8%

Kagan
(n=14)

Liberal

35.7% (5)

64.3% (9)

0.0% (0)

–28.6%

Souter
(n=28)

Liberal

32.1% (9)

64.3% (18)

3.6% (1)

–32.2%

Ginsburg
(n=53)

Liberal

30.2% (16)

66.0% (35)

3.8% (2)

–35.8%

Sotomayor
(n=23)

Liberal

26.1% (6)

73.9% (17)

0.0% (0)

–47.8%

Stevens
(n=41)

Liberal

26.8% (11)

68.3% (28)

4.9% (2)

–41.5%

Justice

n = the number of cases in which the justice authored or joined an opinion that referenced a
substantive canon. For example, cases in which a majority opinion invoked a substantive canon, but
in which the justice authored or joined a dissenting opinion that did not invoke a substantive canon,
are not counted in the denominator.
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Table 5 similarly reports the ideological direction of the
opinions authored by each justice that invoked a substantive
canon.
TABLE 5. IDEOLOGY BY JUSTICE IN AUTHORED OPINIONS
INVOKING SUBSTANTIVE CANONS
(N=87)
Justice
Ideology

% Conservative

% Liberal

% Neither*

Cons–Lib
Difference

Thomas
(n=9)

Conservative

44.4% (4)

55.6% (5)

0.0% (0)

–11.2%

Scalia
(n=9)

Conservative

44.4% (4)

55.6% (5)

0.0% (0)

–11.2%

Alito
(n=8)

Conservative

37.5% (3)

50.0% (4)

12.5% (1)

–12.5%

Roberts
(n=9)

Conservative

33.3% (3)

66.7% (6)

0.0% (0)

–33.4%

Kennedy
(n=7)

Conservative

71.4% (5)

28.6% (2)

0.0% (0)

42.8%

Breyer
(n=9)

Liberal

0.0% (0)

100.0% (9)

0.0% (0)

–100.0%

Kagan
(n=1)

Liberal

100.0% (1)

0.0% (0)

0.0% (0)

100.0%

Souter
(n=5)

Liberal

60.0% (3)

40.0% (2)

0.0% (0)

20.0%

Ginsburg
(n=9)

Liberal

11.1% (1)

88.9% (8)

0.0% (0)

–77.8%

Sotomayor
(n=6)

Liberal

66.7% (4)

33.3% (2)

0.0% (0)

33.4%

Stevens
(n=15)

Liberal

40.0% (6)

53.3% (8)

6.7% (1)

–13.3%

Justice

*
The Conservative and Liberal columns do not reflect opinions authored by justices
that were coded as “unspecified” in ideological direction using the Spaeth Supreme Court
Database’s coding designation.
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Caution should be used in interpreting the precise percentages reported, because the raw number of cases is quite low for
each justice. However, the pattern demonstrated is clear. The
Table shows that four of the justices employed substantive canons
to reach outcomes consistent with their ideological preferences in
the majority of opinions they authored.158 Four justices—Scalia,
Thomas, Alito, and Justice David Souter—wrote opinions that
used substantive canons to support liberal and conservative outcomes at equal or nearly equal rates.159 Roberts and Sotomayor
were the only justices who employed substantive canons inconsistently with their ideological preferences in a substantial
majority of the cases in which they authored an opinion that
used substantive canons.160 The next Section discusses Roberts’s
use of substantive canons in greater detail, arguing that he often
invoked such canons because of institutional concerns, including
a desire to avoid upsetting congressional intent.

158

See Table 5.
See id (reporting a one-case differential between liberal and conservative outcomes for Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Souter).
160 See id (reporting that Roberts used substantive canons to reach liberal outcomes
in 66.7 percent of the opinions he authored that invoked substantive canons, and to
reach conservative outcomes in only 33.3 percent of these opinions, and that Sotomayor
similarly used substantive canons to reach conservative outcomes in 66.7 percent of the
opinions she authored that invoked substantive canons, and to reach liberal outcomes in
only 33.3 percent of these opinions). Justice Elena Kagan was not included in this count
because she authored only one opinion in the data set that invoked a substantive canon.
See id.
159
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TABLE 5A. SUBSTANTIVE CANONS INVOKED BY CONSERVATIVE
JUSTICES IN OPINIONS WITH LIBERAL OUTCOMES
Substantive Canon
Avoidance canon

Thomas
(n=5)

Scalia
(n=7)

Alito
(n=4)

(1)

Rule of lenity

(4)*

Federalism clear statement rule

(1)*

Burden on the taxpayer seeking a
deduction
Non obstante (allowing implied
repeal)

Roberts
(n=8)
(2)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(1)
(1)

APA presumption of judicial review
of all final agency actions

(1)

Presumption against retroactivity

(1)

Narrow construction against the
government

(1)

Presumption against a major
departure from the “long tradition”
of equity practice

(1)

Clear statement rule for attorney’s
fee awards

(1)

(1)

Ambiguity resolved in favor of
veterans

(1)

Clear statement rule for
disallowing state law claims

(1)

Presumption that the Bankruptcy
Code does not erode past practice
absent clear intent

(1)

Presumption favoring the retention
of “long-established and familiar
principles”

(1)

Equal sovereignty principle

(1)

Presumption favoring severability

(1)

Presumption that waivers of
sovereign immunity must be clearly
stated

Kennedy
(n=2)

(1)

As Table 5a shows, there was no clear pattern in the specific
substantive canons that the conservative justices invoked in

In one case, Roberts authored a majority opinion that referenced both the avoidance canon and an equal sovereignty principle. See generally NAMUDNO, 557 US 193.
In another, he authored a majority opinion that referenced both the avoidance canon and
a presumption favoring severability. See generally NFIB, 132 S Ct 2566.
*
In one case, Scalia authored a concurring opinion that referenced both the rule of
lenity and a federalism clear statement rule. See Fowler, 563 US at 682–85 (Scalia concurring in the judgment).
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support of liberal outcomes. While Scalia did invoke the rule of
lenity often—in four of nine opinions he authored (representing
four of ten substantive canons referenced in those opinions)—
both he and the other conservative justices invoked an array of
other substantive canons as well when authoring opinions that
reached liberal results.
The data regarding the justices’ ideological use of substantive canons—or, perhaps more accurately, demonstrating that
substantive canons do not seem to be constraining the justices to
vote against their ideological preferences in most cases—are not
surprising. Several earlier studies have found that the members
of the Court tend to vote consistently with their ideological preferences in statutory cases.161 But the data showing that Roberts
and Scalia used substantive canons to support liberal outcomes
more often than conservative outcomes in the opinions they authored, and that several of the other conservative justices, including Thomas, authored or joined opinions that invoked substantive canons to reach liberal outcomes in as many (or nearly
as many) cases as they did to reach conservative outcomes, are
unexpected and noteworthy. This is especially so in light of the
widespread scholarly assumption, detailed in Part I, that judges—
particularly textualist judges—use substantive canons manipulatively, to subvert legislative intent and to justify outcomes
that accord with their policy preferences.
C.

Doctrinal Analysis: Attentiveness to Congressional Intent

As discussed in Part I.A, the conventional consensus among
legal scholars has been that judges employ substantive canons
in a manner that usurps or frustrates legislative policy preferences. But doctrinal analysis of the Roberts Court’s substantive
canon cases—and particularly of the opinions that rely primarily
on a substantive canon—reveals a substantial number of cases
in which the justices used substantive canons to preserve congressional intent.162 This Section describes how the Roberts
161 See, for example, Cross, The Theory and Practice of Statutory Interpretation at
176 (cited in note 89); Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 57–60 (cited in note 26).
162 “Congressional intent” is a notoriously amorphous term—one that eludes simple
definition and has generated much controversy in the statutory interpretation literature.
See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person,
fictive for a collective body.”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv L Rev 863,
870 (1930) (“A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words
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Court, many times in opinions authored by Roberts, has used substantive canons to honor congressional overrides of prior Supreme
Court decisions, to preserve long-standing statutes from judicial
invalidation, and to approximate congressional intent.
The cases are remarkable not just because they challenge
the conventional account that substantive canons tend to be
used to trump legislative intent, but also because several invoke
substantive canons that are by nature designed to check Congress,
or even to defeat congressional intent in the name of some larger—
typically constitutional—concern. The avoidance canon, for example, deliberately seeks to curtail the reach of federal statutes
in order to cure potential constitutional defects—even when
Congress may have intended a much broader reach and wished
to push the envelope as far as possible regarding what is constitutionally permissible. Similarly, federalism clear statement
rules, such as the presumption against preemption, are designed
to cut back the scope of congressional legislation in order to preserve state laws and power. Yet as the cases discussed in this
Section demonstrate, the Roberts Court has used both of these
canons to fulfill likely congressional intent, despite their intentnegating design. By contrast, other substantive canons seem designed to effectuate Congress’s larger policy goals regarding particular subject areas—for example, the maxim that preferences
in the Bankruptcy Code are to be narrowly construed in order to
fulfill the Code’s equal distribution goal—and the Roberts Court

which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably
did have, different ideas and beliefs.”); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an
“It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 Intl Rev L & Econ 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals
have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not. To pretend
otherwise is fanciful.”); William N. Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 16–21
(Harvard 1994) (arguing that actual congressional intent is almost always unknowable
and that conventional intent is equally unhelpful because of strategic behavior such as
vote counting). In this Section, which highlights judicial efforts to honor congressional
intent, I use the term to refer to any expression of legislative design that the Court takes
to represent the enacting Congress’s intent—including the enacting Congress’s expressed goal of overriding a previous judicial interpretation, inferences drawn from legislative history, and the presumption that the enacting Congress would have wanted the
statute it enacted to be upheld rather than invalidated. For purposes of this Section,
what matters is not whether the Court got Congress’s intent right but, rather, whether
the Court endeavored to discern or made an effort to determine what that intent was
and to construe the statute in a manner that would effectuate, rather than undermine,
what it perceived to be Congress’s intent.
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has invoked such canons in a manner that furthers congressional
intent as well.
In providing these case examples, I do not mean to suggest
that cases do not exist in which the members of the Roberts
Court invoked substantive canons without paying attention to
congressional intent, or even used substantive canons to defeat
congressional intent. Rather, my aim is to bring to light the fact
that substantive canon use is not necessarily inconsistent with
attentiveness to congressional intent, and that substantive canons were not used to defeat congressional intent in most cases in
which they were invoked. Indeed, my doctrinal analysis of the
cases in this study revealed only fifteen opinions (out of eightyseven total) in which the members of the Roberts Court invoked
substantive canons in a manner that arguably served to defeat
Congress’s intent.163
163 See generally Arlington Central, 548 US 291 (federalism clear statement) (holding that the IDEA does not authorize the recovery of expert fees by prevailing parties
against states); Rapanos, 547 US 715 (federalism clear statement and avoidance) (limiting
the Clean Water Act’s reach to relatively stable bodies of water); Piccadilly Cafeterias, 554
US 33 (federalism clear statement) (limiting the stamp tax exemption in the Bankruptcy
Code to plans already confirmed under Chapter 11); Altria, 555 US 70 (presumption
against preemption) (holding that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act does
not preempt a party’s state law fraud claim); Chamber of Commerce, 563 US 582 (presumption against preemption) (holding that the Immigration Reform and Control Act did
not preempt Arizona’s sanctions on employing unauthorized aliens via a licensing program despite an explicit preemption clause); Santos, 553 US 507 (rule of lenity) (limiting
a federal money laundering statute to apply to criminal profits but not receipts); United
States v Hayes, 555 US 415 (2009) (Roberts dissenting) (rule of lenity) (arguing that a
domestic relationship is a defining element of domestic violence under the Gun Control
Act of 1968); Rodriquez, 553 US 377 (Souter dissenting) (rule of lenity) (arguing that a
state’s maximum prison term should not be applied to a federal conviction for possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon); Sossamon, 563 US 277 (narrow construction for waivers of sovereign immunity) (holding that states do not waive sovereign immunity from
private suits for money damages under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 when they accept federal funding, despite the Act’s express provision
of a private cause of action against a government); Microsoft, 550 US 437 (presumption
against extraterritorial application of domestic laws) (holding that Microsoft was not liable under the Patent Act for foreign installations of Windows that had the potential to
infringe AT&T’s patent); Hamdan, 548 US 557 (common law of war must clearly authorize trial by military commission) (holding that the military commission convened to try a
Yemeni national was not authorized and lacked the power to proceed); CBOCS, 553 US
442 (Thomas dissenting) (affirmative evidence of congressional intent necessary for an
implied remedy) (arguing that 42 USC § 1981 does not encompass retaliation claims);
AT&T Corp v Hulteen, 556 US 701 (2009) (presumption against retroactivity) (holding
that an employer does not violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act by applying a rule
that gives less retirement credit for pregnancy than for other medical leave when the rule
is applied only to the period before the Act’s passage); Stoneridge Investment Partners,
LLC v Scientific-Atlanta, Inc, 552 US 148 (2008) (no expansion of private rights beyond
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1. Honoring overrides.
The canon of constitutional avoidance has long been criticized as sanctioning the judicial revision of statutes in a manner
that undercuts Congress’s design.164 The canon operates on the
assumption that Congress would not want to press constitutional
limits and would rather have its laws upheld in some form than
invalidated as unconstitutional.165 But as several scholars have
pointed out, it might make more sense to presume that Congress
prefers to legislate to the maximum extent of its power and to
have its work product given full effect—and for the Court to
openly say so when it believes that work product to be unconstitutional, rather than use the possibility of a constitutional violation as an excuse to rewrite the statute.166
Given these prevailing assumptions, it was surprising to
find a number of Roberts Court cases in which the justices
seemed to be using the avoidance canon to honor congressional
intent—not just paying lip service to what Congress presumably wanted, but engaging in a serious effort to give effect to
Congress’s overall aim in amending or enacting a statute. The
cases took two forms. First, a number of cases involved opinions
that invoked the avoidance canon to support a construction that
honored a recent congressional override. Second, a handful of
cases involved opinions that used the canon to preserve a longstanding statute from what the opinions explicitly found would

congressional intent) (holding that a private right of action under the Securities Exchange
Act did not reach the respondents); Gonzalez, 132 S Ct 641 (clear statement rule for statutory limits on jurisdiction) (holding, among other things, that 28 USC § 2253(c)(3) does
not set forth a jurisdictional rule).
164 See, for example, Schauer, 1995 S Ct Rev at 74 (cited in note 9) (“[I]n interpreting statutes so as to avoid ‘unnecessary’ constitutional decisions, the Court frequently
interprets a statute in ways that its drafters did not anticipate, and, constitutional questions aside, in ways that its drafters may not have preferred.”) (citation omitted); Frickey,
93 Cal L Rev at 444 (cited in note 32) (“Many of the Court’s opinions used the avoidance
canon to confine statutes to domains narrower than their enacting Congresses probably
intended.”).
165 See Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 726
(cited in note 1); Hasen, 2009 S Ct Rev at 186 (cited in note 46).
166 See Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 726
(cited in note 1); Schauer, 1995 S Ct Rev at 74 (cited in note 9); Mashaw, Greed, Chaos,
and Governance at 105 (cited in note 9) (arguing that a “truly restrained court . . . would
do better to confront the constitutional question head on” because “even if [the court] invalidates the law, it at least returns the legislature to the status quo ante and gives the
legislature a more realistic chance of concocting a constitutional policy that is close to its
most-preferred position”); Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter at 43–45 (cited in note 9).
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be otherwise-certain constitutional invalidity—rather than to
rewrite the statute based on speculated or possible invalidity, as
the conventional critique predicts.
The first set of cases tended to follow this pattern: an earlier
Supreme Court case invalidated a statute or limited its reach on
constitutional grounds, Congress sought to override the decision
by amending the statute to “fix” the constitutional problem, and
then a new lawsuit arose in which the Court was required to interpret the amended statute—and to determine whether the
amended statute contained the same deficiencies as the original
version. In reviewing the congressional override, the Roberts
Court invoked the avoidance canon and argued that the Court
should read the amended statute in a way that recognized
Congress’s clear intent to remedy the problems that led to invalidation of the original statute, rather than construe the new
statute to repeat the deficiencies contained in the original.
A couple of examples should help illustrate. First, in Skilling
v United States,167 the Court considered whether a recently enacted criminal statute covered honest-services fraud, including
investment fraud.168 Like other cases involving overrides, Skilling
had a backstory. For decades, the federal courts of appeals had
construed the federal mail and wire fraud statutes to cover acts
that deprive the public of the “intangible” right to receive “honest services,” such as bribery and kickback schemes.169 In
McNally v United States,170 the Supreme Court put a stop to this
construction, holding that the mail fraud statute does not cover
honest-services fraud.171 Congress responded quickly, enacting a
new statute that was designed “specifically to cover” the “intangible right of honest services” that lower courts had protected
prior to McNally.172
Jeffrey Skilling was an Enron executive charged with investment fraud under the new statute; he challenged the new
167

561 US 358 (2010).
Id at 367–68.
169 Id at 399–401.
170 483 US 350 (1987).
171 See id at 360. The Court cited vagueness and federalism concerns, explaining
that “[r]ather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries
ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and
good government for local and state officials,” it would read the statute “as limited in
scope to the protection of property rights.” Id.
172 Skilling, 561 US at 402. See also Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 § 7603, Pub L No
100-690, 102 Stat 4181, 4508.
168
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law as unconstitutionally vague.173 The Roberts Court acknowledged that “Skilling’s vagueness challenge has force,” but invoked the avoidance canon, noting that “[i]t has long been our
practice, [ ] before striking a federal statute as impermissibly
vague, to consider whether the prescription is amenable to a
limiting construction.”174 The Court observed that the history of
Court-Congress interactions demonstrated that Congress intended for the new statute “to refer to and incorporate the honestservices doctrine recognized in Court of Appeals’ decisions before
McNally derailed the intangible-rights theory of fraud.”175 It
then found that while the pre-McNally case law was inconsistent about the outer reaches of the honest-services doctrine,
the “vast majority” of honest-services cases decided before
McNally involved offenders who participated in bribery or kickback schemes, in violation of a fiduciary duty.176 In order to “preserve the statute without transgressing constitutional limitations,” the Court thus read the new law to criminalize “only the
bribe-and-kickback core of the pre-McNally case law” and not to
apply to investment frauds such as that committed by Skilling.177
Although the majority opinion in Skilling limited the reach
of the new honest-services statute, it did so in a manner that
very consciously sought to preserve coverage of the primary conduct associated with the doctrine—and the only conduct indisputably intended to be covered by Congress. Indeed, because
pre-McNally case law was unclear about what behavior beyond
bribes and kickbacks counted as honest-services fraud, it is uncertain whether the behavior left out by the Court’s construction
fell within Congress’s consideration and whether legislators had
any specific intent to include or not include it within the new
statute’s reach.
Further, in applying the avoidance canon to limit the statute’s coverage, the Court made clear that the alternative was
near-certain constitutional invalidation on vagueness grounds.178
In other words, the limiting construction was the only way to
give effect to Congress’s clearly expressed intent to override
McNally. Thus, the Court was not using a merely possible or
173
174
175
176
177
178

Skilling, 561 US at 402–03.
Id at 405.
Id at 404.
Id at 405, 407.
Skilling, 561 US at 408–09.
See id at 405.
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speculative constitutional concern as an excuse to rewrite the
statute, as some scholars have argued that the avoidance canon
encourages it to do.179 In short, although the Skilling majority
employed the avoidance canon in a manner that cut back the
scope of the honest-services statute, it seemed highly attuned to
congressional intent in so doing. For this reason, the case does
not seem to fit within the conventional account of the relationship between the avoidance canon and congressional intent.
A second example of this form of substantive canon attentiveness to congressional intent occurred in Gonzales v Carhart,180
in which the Court considered the validity of the federal PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.181 That statute was enacted following the Court’s decision in Stenberg v Carhart,182 which held
that a Nebraska “partial-birth abortion” statute violated the
federal Constitution because its ban applied too broadly—
covering the commonly used dilation and evacuation procedure
(“D&E”) as well as the dilation and extraction procedure known
as “partial-birth” abortion (“D&X”).183 In enacting the statute,
Congress was responding directly to the Stenberg ruling and
sought to avoid the Nebraska statute’s constitutional difficulties
by being more precise about the procedures to which it applied.184
The federal Act was very explicit about Congress’s intent to remedy the deficiencies the Court had found in the Nebraska statute;
in fact, its opening provisions expressly referenced the Court’s
opinion in Stenberg.185 Several doctors and the pro-choice organization Planned Parenthood challenged the new federal Act,

179

See, for example, Frickey, 93 Cal L Rev at 444, 447 (cited in note 32):

[T]he avoidance canon is one handy tool, a sort of Swiss army knife for trimming excesses from public law and readjusting what remains thereafter. . . .
. . . In effect, the canon creates a penumbra around the Constitution that
dooms statutes raising serious constitutional questions to creative judicial rewriting, even though, if push came to shove, courts would presumably uphold
the constitutionality of at least some of these laws.
See also Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter at 45 (cited in note 9) (suggesting that the
canon allows judicial rewriting of statutes); Posner, The Federal Courts at 285 (cited in
note 9) (same).
180 550 US 124 (2007).
181 Pub L No 108-105, 117 Stat 1201, codified at 18 USC § 1531.
182 530 US 914 (2000).
183 Id at 921–22, 939, 945–46.
184 Carhart, 550 US at 132–33, 141–43.
185 Id at 132–33.
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arguing that despite Congress’s attempts at precision, it too was
unconstitutionally vague.186
Before addressing the Act’s constitutionality, the Court
sought to determine the scope of the Act’s operation and effect.
The Act’s challengers claimed that it was void for vagueness because, like the Nebraska statute, it was unclear about whether
it reached D&E procedures other than the “partial-birth” procedure.187 The Court disagreed, construing the Act to cover only
the “partial-birth” procedure and not to prohibit other D&E procedures.188 In so doing, the Court highlighted numerous places in
which the Act deliberately differed from the Nebraska statute,
observing that Congress sought “to meet the [ ] objections” the
Court articulated in Stenberg and that “[t]he Act makes the distinction the Nebraska statute failed to draw.”189 The Court then
referenced the canon of constitutional avoidance, noting that the
canon “extinguishes any lingering doubt as to whether the Act
covers the prototypical D&E procedure” because it requires that
“every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality.”190
Far from using the avoidance canon to justify rewriting or
limiting the federal Act in a manner that inhibited the full implementation of Congress’s intent, the Court in Carhart seemed
to pay significant attention to what Congress was trying to
achieve through its statutory override. The Court repeatedly
compared the federal statute to the Nebraska statute invalidated
in Stenberg and focused on the ways in which Congress had
sought to address the problems the Stenberg Court had found
with the Nebraska version.191 Moreover, as in Skilling, the Court
made clear that the alternative to its limiting construction was
constitutional invalidation, and that use of the avoidance canon
offered a way to avert a reading that would render Congress’s
override ineffectual.192
186

Id at 133, 147.
See id at 147–48.
188 See Carhart, 550 US at 149–50.
189 Id at 149–53.
190 Id at 153–54.
191 See id at 151–53.
192 See Carhart, 550 US at 153. A third example of a judicial interpretation that
employed the avoidance canon to honor a congressional override is Roberts’s dissenting
opinion in Boumediene. In Boumediene, a majority of the Court struck down the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)—a legislative response to the Court’s decisions in
Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004), and Hamdan—on the grounds that the MCA
187
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2. Respecting Congress’s work product.
In two prominent cases and a dissenting opinion in a third
case, the members of the Roberts Court also used (or advocated
using) the avoidance canon to preserve a politically salient liberal statute from invalidation. The majority opinions in the first
two cases were written by Roberts, and constituted notable instances of a conservative justice using a substantive canon to
reach a liberal result.193 The third case contained a dissenting
opinion penned by Stevens that invoked the avoidance canon to
argue for the preservation of a high-stakes liberal statute.194
Perhaps the most famous of the cases is National Federation
of Independent Business v Sebelius195 (“NFIB”), in which a divided
Roberts Court upheld most provisions of the Obama administration’s Affordable Care Act.196 The key provision at issue was the
individual mandate, which requires individuals to purchase a
health insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage
or be forced to pay a penalty to the IRS when they file their income taxes.197 Challengers claimed that the individual mandate
exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority.198 The Obama administration argued that Congress had the power to mandate
the purchase of health insurance under the Commerce Clause,
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and, as a fallback, under its power to “lay and collect Taxes.”199
A majority of the Court ruled that the health-care law exceeded Congress’s constitutional authority under the Commerce
Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.200 However, a different majority of the Court upheld the mandate under Congress’s

violated the Suspension Clause. Boumediene, 553 US at 732–36. Roberts’s dissenting
opinion argued that the Court should have applied the avoidance canon to interpret a
related statute, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, to allow the DC Circuit to order the
release of unlawfully detained individuals—which would have kept the MCA from running afoul of the Suspension Clause. See id at 822–23 (Roberts dissenting).
193 See generally NFIB, 132 S Ct 2566; NAMUDNO, 557 US 193.
194 See Citizens United, 558 US at 405–08 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195 132 S Ct 2566 (2012).
196 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
197 See 26 USC § 5000A(b)(1).
198 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2580.
199 Id at 2584–85, 2593.
200 See id at 2608 (Roberts) (plurality); id at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito dissenting).
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taxing power.201 Roberts’s opinion acknowledged that “[t]he most
straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.”202 But it went on to construe
the mandate to merely “establish[ ] a condition—not owning
health insurance—that triggers a tax” and to hold that, under
this reading, the mandate was “not a legal command to buy insurance.”203 In so doing, the opinion relied heavily on the avoidance canon. “The question,” Roberts stated, “is not whether [the
tax reading] is the most natural interpretation of the mandate,
but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”204 As he explained,
“every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality.”205 Notably, Roberts’s
opinion laid bare the institutional stakes involved, commenting
that “[t]he Government asks us to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution.
Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal
statutes, it can be so read.”206
These statements make clear that the Court’s interpretation
was driven by a strong commitment to preserving the statute before it if at all possible. Indeed, Roberts openly was influenced
by institutional comity considerations—as evidenced by his explicit references to the “deference owed to federal statutes” and
the fact that he was reading the statute as “[t]he Government
ask[ed].”207 Contrary to the conventional avoidance canon criticism, NFIB simply does not read as a case in which the Court
used the canon to limit the scope of a statute to which it was
hostile, or to fulfill judicial policy preferences at the expense of
legislative ones. Rather, it reads as a case in which the Court
used the avoidance canon to embrace an alternate reading that
the government—that is, the president with the presumptive
support of the enacting Congress—asked it to embrace.208
201

See id at 2594–95 (Roberts, joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan).
NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2593 (Roberts) (opinion).
203 Id at 2594 (Roberts) (opinion).
204 Id (Roberts) (opinion).
205 Id (Roberts) (opinion).
206 NFIB, 132 S Ct at 2594 (Roberts) (opinion) (emphases added).
207 Id (Roberts) (opinion).
208 For an additional example, see Citizens United, 558 US at 405–408 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the majority opinion should have
employed the avoidance canon to narrowly read the Federal Election Commission regulations at issue not to cover video-on-demand transmissions, rather than reaching out to
decide the constitutional issue unnecessarily).
202
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It is worth noting that NFIB involved an extraordinarily
visible, high-stakes statute enacted by a recent Congress. This
may explain why Roberts—hardly an intentionalist by philosophy209—voted to uphold the statute. As the chief justice, Roberts
may have been particularly concerned about institutional considerations, including the need to respect the legislative branch,
preserve Congress’s work product, and protect the legitimacy of
the Court, in a case that was closely watched and certain to generate significant public attention. Some have read his avoidance
canon opinions less charitably, suggesting that he has used the
canon to perform radical surgery on statutory text, and that he
has done so in order to pave the way for future constitutional invalidation.210 I find this sinister view to be a bit extreme—
indeed, there is nothing in NFIB that suggests the Court will
invalidate the Affordable Care Act on constitutional grounds in
the future.211 I discuss Roberts’s relatively high rate of reference
to substantive canons in general in Part II.B.1.
3. Approximating intent.
The Roberts Court also has applied substantive canons in a
manner that seeks to approximate Congress’s intent in run-of-themill cases that are not politically salient. Consider, for example,

209

See note 12.
See Re, 17 Green Bag 2d at 175 (cited in note 19). Such criticisms have focused on
the fact that the Court used the avoidance canon to punt deciding the constitutionality of
the Voting Rights Act in NAMUDNO, only to turn around a few years later and invalidate the coverage formula in § 4(b) of the VRA in Shelby County, Alabama v Holder, 133
S Ct 2612, 2630–31 (2013). See Re, 17 Green Bag 2d at 175 (cited in note 19); Katyal and
Schmidt, 128 Harv L Rev at 2111 (cited in note 7). But even if we assume that the
NAMUDNO Court invoked the avoidance canon to set up its eventual invalidation of the
coverage formula in § 4(b) of the VRA (an assumption that ignores the fact that four liberal justices voted with the majority in NAMUDNO and that Congress could have
changed its coverage formula in the years between NAMUDNO and Shelby County), see
NAMUDNO, 557 US at 195, this does not mean that the Court uses the avoidance canon
strategically as a general matter, or in its other cases.
211 On the contrary, in King v Burwell, 135 S Ct 2480 (2015), the Court—led by
Roberts—emphasized Congress’s purpose and design in interpreting a provision of the
Affordable Care Act that allows tax subsidies to be paid to individuals who enroll in a
health insurance plan through “an Exchange established by the State” to apply to individuals enrolled through federally operated exchanges. See id at 2495–96. The Court
stressed that to construe the statute otherwise would bring about “the type of calamitous result that Congress plainly meant to avoid” and argued that “Congress passed the
Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all
possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and
avoids the latter.” Id at 2496.
210
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Howard Delivery Service, Inc v Zurich American Insurance Co,212
in which the Court invoked a substantive canon dictating that
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code should be narrowly construed.213 Howard involved a Bankruptcy Code section that “accords a priority, among unsecured creditors’ claims, for unpaid
‘wages, salaries, or commissions’ and for unpaid contributions to
‘an employee benefit plan.’” 214 It was uncontested that the provision covered “fringe benefits that complete a pay package”—for
example, retirement plans and “group health, life, and disability
insurance.”215 Howard raised the question whether the priority
provision “also encompasse[d] claims for unpaid premiums on a
policy purchased by an employer to cover its workers’ compensation liability.”216 The Court held that the priority provision did
not cover such unpaid premiums.217 In so ruling, it discussed the
evolutionary history of the priority provision, citing legislative
history explaining that the provision covers “health insurance
programs, life insurance plans, pension funds, and all other
forms of employee compensation that [are] not in the form of
wages.”218 The Court then observed that workers’ compensation
does not compensate employees for work performed but, rather,
for on-the-job injuries, and that workers’ compensation regimes
substitute for tort liability, not for wage payments.219 Finally,
the Court emphasized that one of the Bankruptcy Code’s underlying objectives is to ensure the “equal distribution” of payments
to all creditors and invoked the “corollary” presumption that
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code allowing preferences must be
narrowly construed.220
Throughout its discussion, the Court’s focus was on Congress’s
intent and design with respect to the scope of the priority provision. Unsatisfied that that intent and design encompassed the
premium payments at issue in the case, the Court fell back on
the Bankruptcy Code’s underlying equal distribution purpose,
and a substantive canon based on that underlying purpose. The

212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

547 US 651 (2006).
See id at 667.
Id at 654 (citation omitted), quoting 11 USC § 507(a)(4)(A), (a)(5).
Howard, 547 US at 654.
Id at 654–55.
See id at 655.
Id at 658–59 (brackets in original).
See Howard, 547 US at 662–65.
Id at 667.
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Court thus seemed to use the “narrow construction of Bankruptcy
Code preferences” canon as a means to effectuate Congress’s intent and purpose—not as a vehicle for judicial abrogation of legislative policy preferences.
A number of the Court’s preemption cases also contain judicial efforts to divine congressional intent, often while invoking
the presumption against preemption. In Wyeth v Levine,221 for
example, a majority of the Court concluded that the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act222 (FDCA) does not preempt state
law tort claims alleging that manufacturers placed inadequate
warnings on drug labels.223 In so ruling, the Court invoked the
presumption against preemption in conjunction with the Act’s
purpose, legislative history, congressional intent, and other canons.224 Notably, the Court emphasized that Congress enacted the
FDCA in order to “bolster consumer protection against harmful
products”—quoting congressional hearing testimony and floor
statements to show that Congress intended to continue to allow
state law claims of this kind when it enacted the FDCA.225 The
Court also stressed Congress’s “awareness of the prevalence of
state tort litigation” and argued that Congress’s failure to expressly preempt state tort law on inadequate warnings in labels
despite such awareness “is powerful evidence that Congress did
not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring
drug safety and effectiveness.”226 Thus, far from using the preemption canon as a blunt instrument to curtail congressional intent in
furtherance of judicially preferred policies, the Court employed the
canon to help reinforce its sense of Congress’s intent. Moreover, it
did not use the canon to supersede statutory purpose, legislative
history, or other indicia of legislative intent; instead, it paid significant attention to these intent-focused interpretive resources and
employed a substantive canon to achieve a result consistent with
the reading dictated by these other resources.
Similarly, in Riegel v Medtronic, Inc,227 the Court considered
whether the Medical Device Amendments of 1976228 (MDA)’s
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

555 US 555 (2009).
52 Stat 1040 (1938), codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq.
See Wyeth, 555 US at 558–59.
See id at 566–68.
Id at 574 & n 7.
Id at 574–75 (emphasis added).
552 US 312 (2008).
Pub L No 94-295, 90 Stat 539.
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preemption clause bars common-law claims challenging the design or labeling of a medical device once the design or label has
gained premarket approval from the FDA.229 This time, the Court
concluded that the federal statute did preempt the state law
claims.230 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion argued that the MDA should not be read to preempt state commonlaw claims seeking compensation for injuries caused by defectively designed or labeled medical devices because Congress did
not intend for the MDA to radically curtail state common-law
suits; rather, in enacting the MDA, Congress was trying to
preempt only state premarket regulation of medical devices.231
The dissent began its analysis with the presumption against
preemption and then invoked House and Senate reports describing several medical device failures and resulting injuries that
motivated Congress to enact the MDA,232 as well as comments by
the Act’s sponsor indicating that “[this] legislation is written so
that the benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer.”233
The dissent also made a “dog that did not bark” legislative intent argument, insisting that “[i]t is difficult to believe that
Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse for large numbers of consumers injured by defective
medical devices.”234 Thus, the dissent used the preemption canon
in tandem with and as a means to fulfill congressional intent, not
as a tool for trumping legislative intent with judicial preferences.
***
As noted above, in offering these examples of the justices’
attentiveness to congressional intent, I do not mean to suggest
that the Court does not at times use substantive canons in a
manner that defeats or contradicts congressional intent. My argument is based purely on examples, and opposing examples
surely exist. Indeed, some substantive canons are by nature designed to check Congress and, therefore, almost always are applied in a manner that restrains congressional intent. Federalism
229

See Riegel, 552 US at 315.
See id at 330.
231 See id at 333 (Ginsburg dissenting).
232 See id at 334–36 & n 5 (Ginsburg dissenting).
233 Riegel, 552 US at 336 n 4 (Ginsburg dissenting), quoting Medical Devices
Amendments of 1975, S 510, 94th Cong, 1st Sess, in 121 Cong Rec 10688 (Apr 17, 1975)
(statement of Sen Kennedy).
234 Riegel, 552 US at 337 (Ginsburg dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
230
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clear statement rules impose deliberate obstacles to congressional interference with state authority, and the Roberts Court
sometimes applied these without focusing on congressional intent.235 The rule of lenity, likewise, gives the benefit of the doubt
to criminal defendants when Congress has not been clear
enough about the reach of a criminal statute, even though it is
almost always the case that Congress would prefer for the benefit of the doubt to go to the government.236 My point in providing
the case examples in this Section is not to argue that the conventional view that judges use substantive canons to defeat legislative intent is wrong per se but, rather, that it is overstated.
Substantive canons can be used, and sometimes are used, to defeat congressional intent—but they also regularly are used to further congressional intent. In other words, there is nothing inherent about substantive canons as an interpretive resource that
necessitates that they will be used to contradict legislative preferences. Moreover, this is true even with respect to substantive
canons that are designed to check Congress, such as the avoidance canon and the presumption against federal preemption of
state laws, as the cases discussed in this Section show. Finally, it
is significant that two of the Roberts Court’s most frequent
235 See generally, for example, Arlington Central, 548 US 291; Rapanos, 547 US 715.
In Arlington Central, for example, the Court interpreted a provision of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) that authorizes courts to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to parents who prevail in lawsuits against their children’s school boards. 20 USC § 1415(i)(3)(B). At issue was whether costs associated with
hiring expert witnesses and consultants who assisted in the parents’ litigation against
the school boards were included in this provision. A conference committee report on the
IDEA stated that “[t]he conferees intend that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the
costs’ include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and the reasonable costs
of any test or evaluation which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the . . .
case.” Arlington Central, 548 US at 302 (bracket omitted and ellipsis in original), quoting
Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 Conference Report, HR Conf Rep No 99687, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 1807, 1808. The Court rejected this on-point legislative history as well as arguments that the IDEA’s purpose to
“ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education,” 20 USC § 1400(d)(1)(A), could be fulfilled only by reimbursing parents for
expert testimony necessary to demonstrate the child’s disability and need for accommodations. See Arlington Central, 548 US at 302–04. Instead, it invoked and relied heavily
on a substantive canon—a clear statement rule demanding that statutes enacted under
the Spending Clause be crystal clear about any costs they might impose on state and local governments. See id at 296–98, 303–04. This is a clear example of a case in which a
substantive canon was used in the manner contemplated by the conventional wisdom—
that is, to trump Congress’s clearly expressed intent to include such expert fees in the
provision allowing for reallocation of costs.
236 See Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 957 (cited in note 25).
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employers of substantive canons—Stevens and Sotomayor—are
intentionalist judges who view congressional intent as the lodestar of statutory interpretation. The fact that these intentseeking justices invoked substantive canons at higher rates than
did their textualist counterparts is strong evidence that the conventional account misses something important about textualism’s relationship to substantive canons237 and about the relationship between substantive canons and congressional intent.
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
The data reported in Part II have important theoretical implications, calling into question several conventional assumptions about substantive canons and the work that they perform
in statutory interpretation. This Part explores the theoretical
upshot of the data regarding the Roberts Court’s use of substantive canons. It argues that the data suggest that substantive
canons have received a “bum rap” from academics, who have
overestimated the role that such canons play in the Court’s
statutory interpretation cases—and that such canons may not
be as dangerous or dastardly as commentators have painted
them out to be. The Article posits that one reason for the mismatch between academic perception and reality likely is an excessive scholarly focus on the federalism clear statement rules,
which represent only a fraction of all the substantive canons
employed by the Court.238 The data also suggest that Justice
Scalia has received a bit of a bum rap for ostensibly using substantive canons aggressively, while criticizing them in theory; in
reality, he invoked such canons in only nine of eighty-two opinions authored during the period studied and relied primarily on
them in only three opinions.
The data also have important implications for two leading
theories of statutory interpretation. First, they undermine longstanding scholarly assumptions that substantive canons provide
a necessary “escape valve” for textualist judges who find a statute’s plain meaning unpalatable. It turns out that, in practice,
textualist judges invoke substantive canons rarely, and less often than some of their intentionalist colleagues. Further, during
the period studied, textualist judges invoked substantive canons

237
238

See Parts III.A–B.
See Part II.B.2.
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to support liberal outcomes in a substantial minority of cases—
sometimes at rates equal to the rates at which they invoked
such canons to support conservative outcomes.239
At the same time, the data lend some support to pragmatic
theories of statutory interpretation—demonstrating that practical reasoning, along with the Court’s own statutory precedents,
plays a gap-filling or escape valve role similar to that which
scholars have attributed to substantive canons. This Part concludes by discussing how the substantive canons employed most
often by the Roberts Court align with state and federal legislators’ preferences regarding interpretive methodology and what
the substantive canon data might add to recent discussions about
methodological stare decisis—the suggestion that federal courts
should adopt a binding statutory interpretation methodology.
A.

A Bum Rap

As discussed in Part I.A, scholars of different theoretical
stripes tend to share the views that textualist judges employ
substantive canons regularly, that there is theoretical tension
between substantive canons and textualism, and that substantive canons play a significant role in the interpretation of statutes. Further, many scholars view substantive canons as trump
cards that judges illegitimately whip out to justify a construction
that conflicts with the one dictated by other interpretive resources, including legislative intent.
But the data and doctrinal analysis of the Roberts Court’s
first six and a half terms suggest that these scholarly assumptions may be overstated—and that, as an interpretive tool, substantive canons may not be as nefarious, or the Court may not
be as wily in its use of them, as scholars have imagined. Substantive canons are infrequently invoked, and even when invoked, they are relied on only in passing or as a secondary interpretive resource in the vast majority of opinions (71.3
percent).240 Indeed, the much-maligned classic case in which the
Court pulls a substantive canon out of a hat and uses it to reject
a statutory reading dictated by the statute’s text, purpose, and
other traditional tools may be the exception rather than the
norm.

239
240

See Table 4.
See Tables 2 and 3.
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Of course, there is a difference between measuring the
Court’s quantitative use of substantive canons and measuring
its qualitative use of such canons. The fact that the justices infrequently invoke substantive canons does not mean that such
canons are not powerful when used; nor do the data showing
that the justices rely “primarily” on such canons in only 28.7
percent of opinions and that they appear to have used substantive canons to defeat congressional intent in only fifteen cases
mean that those particular cases are not worth worrying about.
Indeed, some may argue that even one nefarious use of a substantive canon to circumvent the statute’s plain meaning or congressional intent is odious—and can work sufficient harm to justify the academic outcry against such canons. Some might even
view the Court’s infrequent and inconsistent use of substantive
canons as more problematic than the widespread use of such
canons would be, because infrequent use fails to put Congress on
notice about the background norms that might suddenly pop up
to do significant work in the odd case, and thereby increases the
likelihood that Congress’s intent will be undermined. These are
legitimate worries. I do not necessarily disagree with individualized criticisms of the Court’s use of particular substantive canons in particular cases, or mean to suggest that substantive
canons are harmless merely because they are infrequently
used. My point, rather, is that the data suggest that there is
nothing inherently harmful, or intent defeating, or plain meaning eschewing, about substantive canons as an interpretive resource—and that the prevailing scholarly wisdom about substantive canons as a category has swept too broadly.
In addition, textualist judges and the substantive canons as
a group may deserve greater credit for neutrality than scholars
or the conventional account has given them. The ideological data
reported in Tables 4 and 5, showing that the Roberts Court’s
textualist and textualist-leaning justices—who also are its most
conservative justices—have employed substantive canons to
reach liberal results in a substantial percentage of opinions,241
are stunning. The data suggest that substantive canons may
have some, at least mild, constraining effect on the conservative
justices, and that the standard scholarly account that the justices wield substantive canons in a purely ideological manner, to

241

See Tables 4 and 5.

KRISHNAKUMAR_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

882

The University of Chicago Law Review

6/14/2017 11:25 AM

[84:825

justify judicial policy preferences, is not accurate in many cases.
Indeed, scholars may owe both the conservative justices and the
substantive canons, as an interpretive tool, an apology—and the
latter a more charitable place in the statutory interpretation
annals.
Scalia in particular may deserve more credit than scholars
have given him for being consistent, in practice, with his theoretical criticism of substantive canons. As noted in Part II.B, during
the Roberts Court’s first six and a half terms, Scalia rarely invoked substantive canons in the opinions he authored (11.0 percent).242 If we remove cases in which Scalia authored an opinion
invoking the rule of lenity—a substantive canon he has argued
is justified based on its antiquity243—then his rate of use for this
interpretive resource falls to 7.3 percent.244 Further, Scalia
joined or authored an opinion that invoked substantive canons
in only 16.9 percent (50 of 296) of the cases in the data set,245
and only 3 (out of 9) of the opinions he authored that invoked
substantive canons relied on a substantive canon as a primary
interpretive resource.246 Thus, Scalia seems to have hewed more
closely to his theoretical criticism of substantive canons, at least
in recent years, than scholars have given him credit for.
The puzzle thus arises: What accounts for the mismatch between the conventional view of substantive canons and actual
judicial practice during the Roberts Court’s first six and a half
years? Or for the differences in how many substantive canons
the Court invoked during the Burger/Rehnquist Court years
versus the Roberts Court years? One explanation may be that
much of the conventional account—and criticism—regarding
substantive canons seems to have been formulated in response
to the Court’s creation and aggressive application of several new
“super-strong” clear statement rules during the 1980s and

242

See Table 1.
See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 29 (cited in note 2).
244 See Appendix. As the Appendix shows, there were four cases in which Scalia authored an opinion that invoked the rule of lenity; however, in one of these cases, he also
invoked a federalism clear statement rule. The 7.3 percent figure reflects the percentage
of opinions authored by Scalia that invoked a substantive canon other than the rule of
lenity (including the one case that also invoked the federalism clear statement rule).
245 See Table 4.
246 See generally Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 US 247 (2010); United
States v Santos, 553 US 507 (2008); Sackett v Environmental Protection Agency, 132 S Ct
1367 (2012).
243
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1990s.247 As Professors Eskridge and Frickey have pointed out,
these clear statement rules were a “remarkable” and “striking
innovation,” transforming background norms about federalism
and sovereign immunity into nearly insurmountable obstacles to
federal legislation that seeks to supersede state laws or waive
the government’s immunity from suit.248 Clear statement rules
also are extraordinarily countermajoritarian and dismissive of
congressional intent in that they “permit the Court to override
probable congressional preferences in statutory interpretation in
favor of norms and values favored by the Court.”249 Worse, superstrong clear statement rules sanction this judicial displacement of
congressional preferences with virtually no notice to Congress,
which may be aware of the background norm the Court seeks to
enforce but receives no warning that it must be exceptionally
clear about its intent to override that norm in the text of the
statute—rather than, say, in the legislative history—until the
Court issues its decision several years later. As Eskridge and
Frickey have observed, this notice problem is particularly disturbing when the Court applies a new super-strong clear statement rule to an older statute, enacted during an era when different statutory interpretation techniques predominated and
courts rarely required clear statements of any kind in the statute’s text.250
Given the radical effects worked by clear statement rules,
the Rehnquist Court’s invention of several new and “superstrong” versions of these rules garnered significant academic
attention251 and criticism and may—uncoincidentally—have

247 For an example of such a rule, see generally United States v Nordic Village, Inc,
503 US 30 (1992) (creating a super-strong clear statement rule for waiving federal sovereign immunity).
248 Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev at 597 (cited in note 7).
249 Id at 638.
250 See id at 622.
251 For just a few examples, see id at 597, 619–29; Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at
1655 (cited in note 42). See also generally John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and
the Constitution, 110 Colum L Rev 399 (2010); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism,
and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 Harv L Rev 1959 (1994); Larry J. Obhof,
Federalism, I Presume? A Look at the Enforcement of Federalism Principles through Presumptions and Clear Statement Rules, 2004 Mich St L Rev 123; John Copeland Nagle,
Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 Wis L Rev 771;
William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of Clear
Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 Ind L J 211 (1982); William P. Marshall, The
Eleventh Amendment, Process Federalism and the Clear Statement Rule, 39 DePaul L
Rev 345 (1989).
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distorted scholars’ views of substantive canons as a category.
That is, scholars may have been a little too quick to attribute the
characteristics associated with clear statement rules—for example, their centrality to textualist jurisprudence and their inattentiveness to congressional intent—to all substantive canons.
Moreover, the sheer shock value of the Court’s creation and use
of these “super-strong” clear statement canons during the early
Rehnquist Court years may have created a heightened perception of the amount of work that substantive canons as a whole
perform in the Court’s statutory interpretations. I say “heightened perception” because, in reality, the Rehnquist Court may
not have used substantive canons more often than the Roberts
Court; recall that the Brudney-Ditslear study found low overall
rates of judicial references to substantive canons in employment
law cases decided by the Rehnquist Court during its 1986
through 2002 terms (15.6 percent).252
Of course, there also are other factors that may explain why
substantive canons seem to be doing less work on the Roberts
Court than scholars have assumed, and why such canons are being used less frequently and with less variety by the Roberts
Court than during the early years of the Rehnquist Court.253 One
such factor is that federalism clear statement rules may have
been in their heyday during the early Rehnquist Court—the
time period that Eskridge and Frickey happened to study—so
that such canons may have been used more frequently and in
greater variety during the period they studied than during other
periods. That is, the early Rehnquist Court may have perceived
a need to stake out strong protections for underenforced constitutional principles254 related to federalism and sovereign immunity and may have acted with vigor and urgency to articulate
canons that helped it do so in its early years. By the time of the
early Roberts Court, twenty years later, those battles may have
been fought and won, so that the members of the Court—even
those who employed substantive canons energetically during the
early Rehnquist years—have found less need to create or invoke
such canons than they once did. Relatedly, because federalism
252

See Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26).
For the range of substantive canons used by the Rehnquist Court, see generally
Eskridge and Frickey, 45 Vand L Rev 593 (cited in note 7).
254 Consider Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv L Rev 1212 (1978) (developing the concept of “underenforced constitutional norms”).
253
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clear statement rules are now well established, cases involving
such rules may no longer need to be decided by the Supreme
Court. That is, lower courts may be applying such clear statement rules to resolve cases before they even reach the Court; if
this is true, then focusing on the Supreme Court’s docket could
understate the practical importance of substantive canons—
particularly ones that establish bright-line rules that are easy
for lower courts to implement.
Another, related, explanation could be that the Supreme
Court has not undergone a significant political or ideological
shift from the Rehnquist Court to the Roberts Court—and, indeed, seems to have become more solidly conservative since the
early Rehnquist years (1986 through 1991).255 Thus, the canons
created, or modified, by the Rehnquist Court may suit the justices
on the Roberts Court—or at least a majority of those justices—
quite well, and the justices accordingly may see little need to invent new canons as the Rehnquist Court once did. This could
explain the low incidence of “new canon” creation observed in my
study, and perhaps also the decrease in the variety of different
canons invoked—that is, the current Court may be well settled
into a comfort zone with respect to the canons it prefers to invoke, whereas the Rehnquist Court may have been in a substantive canon transition period of sorts. Finally, part of the explanation for the differences in findings may lie in the fact that,
since 2010, the US Supreme Court and Congress have been
more closely aligned, politically and ideologically (skewing conservative), than they were during the first decade of the
Rehnquist Court—when both houses of Congress were controlled
by liberal majorities, while the Court was moderately conservative.256 To the extent that the Court uses substantive canons to

255 See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54
Wayne L Rev 947, 948 (2008) (calling the Roberts Court “the most conservative Court
since the mid-1930s”); Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman, and Nancy Staudt, On the Capacity
of the Roberts Court to Generate Consequential Precedent, 86 NC L Rev 1299, 1321 (2008)
(reporting an empirical finding that “the Roberts Court is significantly more conservative
than the average Court sitting since the 1953 Term”); Adam Liptak, Court under Roberts
Is Most Conservative in Decades (NY Times, July 24, 2010), online at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html (visited Apr 9, 2017) (Perma archive unavailable).
256 See, for example, Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee
Consideration of Constitutional Questions, 105 Nw U L Rev 737, 783 n 205 (2011)
(describing “the ideological distance between the Roberts Court and the Democratic
Congress” before the 2010 elections).
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cut back the scope of legislation, it may see less need to use such
canons in times of political alignment with Congress. Note, however, that while this theory is consistent with the Roberts
Court’s use of substantive canons in cases such as Carhart,257 it
cannot explain Chief Justice Roberts’s use of substantive canons
in cases like NAMUDNO258 or NFIB,259 which upheld statutes
enacted by Democrat-controlled Congresses.
B.

Textualism’s “Escape Valve”?

As discussed in Part I.A, leading legislation scholars have
theorized that substantive canons operate as an “escape valve”
for textualism, providing a justification—couched in timehonored rules—for construing a statute in a manner that conflicts with its plain meaning.260 However, the findings reported
in Part II showing that textualist and textualist-leaning justices
infrequently invoked substantive canons call this assumption into
question.261 Moreover, the findings raise the following queries: If
substantive canons do not regularly serve as an escape valve for
textualist justices, does this mean that textualism in fact has no
escape valve? Or is some other interpretive tool or technique doing the work of filling in gaps and providing an escape mechanism for textualism?
More granular analysis of the Roberts Court’s cases suggests that textualism may in fact have an alternate escape
valve, or valves—namely, Supreme Court precedent, practical
consequences, and perhaps also the common law and other statutory tools. In order to explore the answers to the above questions, I examined the thirty-six out of eighty-two cases in the data
set authored by Scalia that did not reference statutory text or
the plain meaning rule and the twenty-nine out of seventy-seven
cases in the data set authored by Justice Thomas that did not
reference statutory text or plain meaning and sought to identify
what interpretive resources these textualist justices relied on
when they did not base their statutory constructions on text or
plain meaning. In these sixty-five cases, Scalia and Thomas

257

See text accompanying notes 180–92.
See note 210 and text accompanying notes 102–05.
259 See Part II.C.2.
260 See, for example, Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 743 (cited in note 1); Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1).
261 See Table 1 and Part II.B.
258
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overwhelmingly relied on Supreme Court precedent in lieu of
statutory text or plain meaning; in a handful of cases, they also
referenced practical consequences and, to a lesser extent, the
common law and other statutes.262 If we expand this closer study
to examine the 333 opinions in the entire data set that did not
reference text or plain meaning (authored by all of the justices),
Supreme Court precedent and practical consequences again
stand out as the two most frequently referenced alternate interpretive resources.263 Thus, Supreme Court precedent seems to be
the real gap-filling interpretive tool in the Court’s jurisprudence,
followed by practical-consequences-based reasoning.
The Supreme Court’s frequent use of practical consequences
in statutory interpretation cases has been explored in several
earlier empirical studies.264 But the Court’s use of its own precedent as an interpretive resource has gone largely unstudied.265
Scholars may thus far have ignored the Court’s use of its own
precedents to construe statutes because precedent is such an intrinsic part of judging and judicial opinion writing that the Court’s
reliance on it has hardly seemed remarkable. But the data from
the Roberts Court’s first several terms—showing Supreme
Court precedent to be the interpretive resource most frequently
invoked across justices266—suggest that it is important for
262 Of the non–plain meaning cases authored by Scalia or Thomas, thirty-one out of
sixty-five (47.7 percent) relied on Supreme Court precedent, eleven (16.9 percent) referenced practical consequences, eight (12.3 percent) referenced common-law precedent,
seven (10.8 percent) referenced other statutes, seven (10.8 percent) referenced substantive canons, and one referenced no other interpretive tools (1.5 percent). Notably, many
of the practical-consequences-referencing cases also referenced precedent; overall, onethird of precedent-referencing cases also referenced other interpretive tools.
263 The justices referenced precedent in 179 out of 333 (53.8 percent) of these opinions, and practical consequences in 111 (33.3 percent) of these opinions. Of these opinions, 59 referenced both precedent and practical consequences. By way of comparison,
only 43 of these 333 opinions referenced substantive canons (12.9 percent), 75 referenced
legislative history (22.5 percent), 52 referenced intent (15.6 percent), 77 referenced statutory purpose (23.1 percent), 38 referenced common-law precedent (11.4 percent), 50 referenced other statutes (15.0 percent), and 29 referenced dictionary definitions (8.7 percent).
264 See, for example, Schacter, 51 Stan L Rev at 5, 12, 18, 21 (cited in note 89) (discussing the use of “judicially-selected policy norms”); Zeppos, 70 Tex L Rev at 1107–13
(cited in note 89) (discussing the Court’s use of practical considerations in statutory interpretation); Krishnakumar, 62 Hastings L J at 237 (cited in note 87) (discussing the
frequency of the Court’s use of practical consequences as a tool of statutory interpretation compared to other interpretive tools).
265 Professor Lawrence M. Solan’s recent article is a notable exception. See generally
Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 NC L Rev 1165 (2016).
266 As Table 1 shows, Scalia, Thomas, and Justices Alito and Kagan invoked the
text / plain meaning tool more often than they referenced Supreme Court precedent, but
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scholars to examine critically how the Court uses such precedents when tackling a new statutory construction. Does the
Court use its own prior interpretations to trump other interpretive tools, or does the Court use such precedents to corroborate
the reading dictated by other interpretive resources? How often
does the Court employ statutory stare decisis to decide a case?
Are arguments from precedent typically used to “escape” the
statute’s plain meaning, to reinforce it, or simply to fill in gaps
when there is no plain meaning? These are just a few of the
many questions that bear further exploration. At bottom, statutory interpretation theory lacks a good account of whether the
Court uses its own precedents merely to supply authority for
other canons and interpretive tools (for example, as authority for
the rule of lenity or to explain what noscitur a sociis means) or
as an independent interpretive tool that itself dictates a particular statutory construction.
The discovery that textualist judges employ Supreme Court
precedent more often than substantive canons when construing
statutes that do not seem to have a plain meaning also could
have important implications for textualism’s claims to predictability and determinacy. Here is what I mean: Textualists long
have argued that their approach to statutory interpretation is
the most legitimate because it constrains judges, leading
straightforwardly to the one correct reading of a statute.267 Critics have countered that textualism’s dependence on substantive
canons undermines such claims to determinacy because substantive canons are policy based and unpredictable and because
they empower judges to manipulate outcomes268—points that
prominent textualists, including Scalia, have conceded.269

the other seven justices invoked the Court’s own precedent most often. Further, these
four justices all invoked Supreme Court precedent in over 40.0 percent of the cases each
of them authored. For Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, Supreme Court precedent was the tool
used second most often; for Kagan, it was used fourth most often. See Table 1.
267 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 16–18 (cited in note 2);
Maura D. Corrigan, Textualism in Action: Judicial Restraint on the Michigan Supreme
Court, 8 Tex Rev L & Polit 261, 263–64 (2004) (arguing that courts should adopt textualism to “eliminate unpredictability and confusion” and install “a disciplined interpretative
approach”).
268 See, for example, Eskridge, et al, Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation at 743 (cited in note 1). See also note 43.
269 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 28 (cited in note 2);
Manning, 101 Colum L Rev at 125 (cited in note 1).
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The surprising finding that the Roberts Court relies on the
Court’s own precedents to fill in gaps in statutory context far
more often than it relies on substantive canons could change
the contours of this debate in important ways. On the one hand,
Supreme Court precedent cannot be invented and reinvented
the way that substantive canons sometimes can—for example,
the federalism clear statement rules in the 1980s and 1990s. In
this sense, the Court’s heavy reliance on its own precedents may
be less problematic than similar reliance on substantive canons.
On the other hand, reliance on prior judicial decisions is a very
common-law, judge-centered approach to statutory interpretation—not an approach that puts the legislature at its center, as
statutory interpreters are supposed to do. Indeed, most foundational theories of statutory interpretation rest, to some degree,
on a faithful agent model of the Court-Congress relationship—
one that envisions the Court as the agent in a master-servant
relationship with Congress.270 Textualism, notably, claims that it
is more faithful to the legislature than approaches that look to
statutory purpose or legislative history, because it pays close attention to the text that is the product of compromise among differently motivated legislators, rather than elevating the views of
some legislators over others’ as suits the judge’s fancy.271 But
textualism’s form of faithfulness, it turns out, relies significantly
on a judicially generated interpretive resource—the Court’s own
past precedents. This is significant because there is, of course,
substantial room for different interpretations of what precedents
mean when applied to new circumstances—rendering the use
of past precedent as a guide to statutory interpretation a notoriously unpredictable and judge-empowering exercise.272 Indeed, legal realist Professor Karl Llewellyn delineated no fewer
than sixty-four different ways in which judges can apply a prior
precedent.273

270 See, for example, Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 907, 913–14 (cited in
note 25).
271 See, for example, John F. Manning, Statutory Pragmatism and Constitutional
Structure, 120 Harv L Rev 1161, 1162 (2007).
272 See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U Colo L Rev 225, 232–
37 (1999) (arguing that stare decisis in statutory cases gives the courts a lawmaking role
and that this distinguishes our common-law system from code-based legal systems).
273 Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 77–91 (Little,
Brown 1960). Llewellyn’s list has been described as comprising “eight ways to follow
but constrict a precedent, eight to stand by it, thirty-two to expand it, twelve ways to
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Further, even before judges get to the point of arguing over
a precedent’s meaning, they have significant discretion to decide
whether a precedent is even applicable in a particular case, just
as they have discretion to decide whether a substantive canon is
applicable in a particular case. Recent studies are just beginning
to explore the ways in which the members of the Supreme Court
disagree, or “duel,” over the application of the same precedent in
the same case.274 But the lesson from this Article may simply be
that more analysis of this kind is necessary—that is, that scholars need to pay closer attention to how textualists (and other jurists) employ the Court’s prior precedents, no less than they
have paid attention in the past to textualists’ use of substantive
canons. Ultimately, whether textualists supplement textual
analysis with substantive canons or with precedent, they are
supplementing with a judicial source rather than a legislative
source—and that, in itself, is both enormously interesting and
potentially worrisome.
C.

Purposivism

This Article’s findings also have important theoretical implications for other leading theories of statutory interpretation.
Purposivism is an interpretive approach that encourages jurists
to interpret a statute by identifying the statute’s purpose and selecting the meaning that best effectuates that purpose.275 Purposive statutory interpretation typically involves inquiries into
legislative history, the societal problem that prompted the legislature to enact the statute, legislative intent, and other sources
that might shed light on a statute’s objectives. It can entail
guesswork and judicial discretion, but is often defended on the
ground that reliance on legislative history and purpose helps restrict judicial discretion and fulfill congressional intent.276
Purposivism once was the dominant approach to statutory
interpretation, but over the past few decades it has come under
avoid it and four to kill it.” E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 Wayne L Rev
1043, 1051 (1975).
274 See generally, for example, Krishnakumar, 65 Duke L J 909 (cited in note 94);
Solan, 94 NC L Rev 1165 (cited in note 265).
275 See Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in
the Making and Application of Law 1374 (Foundation Press 1994) (William N. Eskridge
Jr and Philip P. Frickey, eds).
276 See John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, 6 Nev L J 1, 2 (2005); Eskridge,
Book Review, 96 Mich L Rev at 1548–49 (cited in note 2).
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significant attack.277 The criticism has come both from textualism and from public-choice theorists, who have condemned it as
providing a rose-colored-glasses view of the legislative process.
Both sets of critics have emphasized the open-endedness of the
search for statutory purpose and have argued that purposebased interpretation enables judges to import their personal policy preferences into the statute.278
The data regarding the Roberts Court’s substantive canon use
have at least two important implications for purposivism. First
and foremost, the data show that despite textualism’s thirty-yearold campaign against legislative history—and despite scholars’
warnings that substantive canon use has increased while legislative history use has decreased279—substantive canons have not
displaced legislative history on the modern Supreme Court. As
noted earlier, eight of the eleven justices who have served on the
Roberts Court—including conservative, textualist-leaning Justices
Alito and Kennedy—referenced legislative history more often
than they referenced substantive canons in the opinions they
authored.280 Moreover, a comparison of my data to Professors
Brudney and Ditslear’s data from the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts shows that the conventional scholarly wisdom is only
half correct: legislative history use did decline significantly from
the Burger Court (46.6 percent) to the Rehnquist (27.7 percent)

277 See Roger Colinvaux, Note, What Is Law? A Search for Legal Meaning and Good
Judging under a Textualist Lens, 72 Ind L J 1133, 1139 (1997) (stating that purposivism
“came under heavy attack” in the 1970s); Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the Supreme Court’s 2003-04 Term, 42 Houston L Rev 565, 574 (2005)
(“Both intentionalism and purposivism came under increasing criticism in the 1980s.”);
John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 2415–17 (2003) (criticizing the reliability of using legislative history in statutory interpretation). See also
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum L Rev 70,
103–04 (2006) (arguing that relying on the text is the best way to make sense of the legislative process); William N. Eskridge Jr and Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan L Rev 321, 333–37 (1990) (describing multiple problems
with the purposivist approach).
278 See, for example, Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation at 25–29 (cited in
note 162) (criticizing purposivism and arguing that the application of statutory purpose
is dependent on the perspective of the interpreter); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History
and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan
L Rev 1833, 1884–85 (1998) (criticizing the “malleability of purposive interpretation”);
Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 Minn L Rev 241, 250–51 (1992) (describing flaws in the purposive approach that could lead principled judges to reach the wrong results).
279 See Part I.A.
280 See Table 1.
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and Roberts Courts (25.0 percent),281 but it has not been replaced
by substantive canon use. Indeed, while substantive canon use
increased from 8.3 percent during the Burger Court to 15.6 percent during the Rehnquist Court and 14.4 percent during the
Roberts Court,282 this 6.1 percentage point increase hardly makes
up for the 21.6 percentage point drop in legislative history references since the Burger Court, nor does it show that substantive
canon use has surged ahead of legislative history use.
This is significant because, as scholars have noted, an important part of what divides textualists from purposivists on the
modern US Supreme Court supposedly is disagreement about
what interpretive tools should be consulted when there is textual
ambiguity (with textualists putting substantive canons second,
while purposivists list legislative history and purpose in that
slot).283 The Roberts Court data suggest that scholars have been
too quick to sound the alarm bells about the death of legislative
history at the hand of substantive canons, or about the inversion
of these two tools in the hierarchy of interpretive resources to be
consulted. Judicial reliance on legislative history may have declined, but substantive canons have not filled the resulting void.
Second, substantive canons may have something to offer
purposivism as an interpretive tool. That is, given the doctrinal
evidence discussed in Part II.C showing that substantive canons
such as the avoidance canon at least sometimes are used to fulfill congressional intent, and given purposivist/intentionalist
Justices Stevens’s and Sotomayor’s willingness to invoke such
canons in a nontrivial percentage of the opinions they author,
purposivism may stand to benefit, as an interpretive theory,
from expanding its interpretive tool kit to encompass certain
substantive canons or to acknowledge ways in which substantive
canons can be used to reinforce statutory purpose.
D. What Role Do the Canons Play?
Scholars have long operated on the assumption that judges
rely significantly on the canons of construction when interpreting statutes.284 This study shows that assumption to be false
281

Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26).
Compare Table 2 with Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 30 (cited in note 26).
283 See Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1842 (cited in note 20).
284 See, for example, Brudney and Ditslear, 58 Vand L Rev at 11 (cited in note 26) (noting that “so many scholars and judges believe the canons perform important interpretive
282
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with respect to substantive canons, in terms of both the frequency of the Court’s references and the weight it places on substantive canons when it references them. But the study also,
surprisingly, shows that the Court relies on traditional tools of
legal analysis, including Supreme Court precedent, practical
consequences, and its own sense of what the words in a statute
mean, at much higher rates than it relies on most statute-specific
interpretive tools.285 That is, the Court invokes its own prior
precedents, practical consequences, and text / plain meaning
with far more frequency than it references statutory purpose,
legislative history, congressional intent, or dictionary definitions.286 The only statute-specific interpretive tool the Court invokes at rates somewhat comparable to the traditional legal

functions” and that judges “refer to them as an integral part of the ratio decidendi that
drives their decisions”).
285 See Tables 1 and 2.
286 I consider text / plain meaning analysis more akin to traditional tools of legal
analysis than to the canons, because judges often rely on their own linguistic experience
or intuition to determine plain meaning—rather than invoking a legal maxim or rule of
thumb. Consider, for example, the recent case Yates v United States, 135 S Ct 1074
(2015), which is not part of my data set. Yates involved a criminal evidence-tampering
statute that punishes one who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the
intent to impede, obstruct, or influence [an] investigation.” 18 USC § 1519. See also
Yates, 135 S Ct at 1078 (Ginsburg) (plurality). At issue was whether a commercial fisherman who had been cited for catching undersized red grouper and instructed to preserve his catch could be convicted of violating this statute when he instructed a crew
member to throw the undersized fish overboard, destroying the evidence of his crime.
Yates, 135 S Ct at 1079–80 (Ginsburg) (plurality). A plurality of the Court concluded that
a fish could not be considered a “tangible object” within the meaning of the statute, relying in part on the noscitur a sociis language canon. Specifically, the plurality observed
that “we rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the company it
keeps—to avoid ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its
accompanying words, thus giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Id at
1085 (Ginsburg) (plurality) (quotation marks omitted). The plurality then noted that
“‘[t]angible object’ is the last in a list of terms that begins ‘any record or document’” and
that “[t]he term is therefore appropriately read to refer, not to any tangible object, but
specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents, i.e., objects
used to record or preserve information.” Id (Ginsburg) (plurality) (brackets omitted). The
dissenting opinion, by contrast, focused on the plain meaning of the term “tangible object,” arguing that “‘tangible object’ means the same thing in § 1519 as it means in everyday language—any object capable of being touched” and that “[a] ‘tangible object’ is an
object that’s tangible.” Id at 1091 (Kagan dissenting). See also id (Kagan dissenting) (“As
the plurality must acknowledge, the ordinary meaning of ‘tangible object’ is ‘a discrete
thing that possesses physical form.’ A fish is, of course, a discrete thing that possesses
physical form. So the ordinary meaning of the term ‘tangible object’ in § 1519, as no one
here disputes, covers fish.”) (citations omitted).
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tools of analysis is the combined language canons + whole-act
rule + grammar canons tool.287
This observation highlights one of the central questions in
statutory interpretation theory—that is, what role do the canons
play? In light of the data, it is worth asking whether the canons
are really playing much of a role at all in the Roberts Court’s
statutory cases—or whether they are, indeed, “windowdressing,” as legal realist Llewellyn once argued.288 Leading legislation scholars have debated these questions for decades, with
Eskridge, Frickey, and Professor Cass Sunstein countering
Llewellyn’s charge and arguing that the canons play an important role, at least as default rules, in guiding courts to certain statutory constructions.289 But the data from the Roberts
Court suggest that the truth may lie somewhere in between the
two opposing positions scholars have staked out. That is, the answer may depend on whether we are talking about substantive
canons or about language canons (defined to include the wholeact rule and grammar rules). Based on the frequency of references to particular interpretive resources, it appears that the
Court does employ language canons often when construing
statutes (in 32.3 percent of all opinions and 67.9 percent of all
majority opinions in the data set, compared to a rate of reference of only 14.4 percent of all opinions and 15.5 percent of majority opinions for substantive canons).290
Further work and analysis is necessary to fully understand
the differences between the Court’s use of language and its use
of substantive canons, but a few possibilities exist. Whole-act

287

See Tables 1 and 2.
Eskridge, 66 U Chi L Rev at 679 (cited in note 22), citing Llewellyn, 3 Vand L
Rev at 401–06 (cited in note 22).
289 Llewellyn famously argued that the canons are after-the-fact justifications, while
Eskridge, Frickey, and Sunstein argued that they are useful default rules. Compare
Llewellyn, 3 Vand L Rev at 401–06 (cited in note 22) (listing the canons in “Thrust” and
“Parry” pairings and stating that the “construction contended for must be sold [ ] by
means other than the use of the canon”), with Eskridge and Frickey, 108 Harv L Rev at
65–67 (cited in note 75) (arguing that canons are useful as an interpretive regime),
Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution at 147–57 (cited in note 26) (describing the debate
around the canons and arguing that they are an important and unavoidable part of statutory interpretation), and Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 Harv L Rev 405, 451–54 (1989) (describing how the canons were “virtually
discredited by the legal realist movement,” but defending their use on the grounds that
“the interpretation of a text requires courts to refer to background norms in interpreting
terms”).
290 See Table 2.
288
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rule comparisons or lists susceptible to various Latin maxims
may, for example, be more readily available in a larger number
of cases than are on-point substantive canons; if the Court is
straightforward in its use of substantive canons, employing
them as helpful guides rather than inventing and reinventing
them as after-the-fact justifications for interpretations reached
based on policy preferences, it may simply be finding fewer occasions in which substantive canons, as compared to language
canons, are helpful. Alternately, the members of the Roberts
Court may consider language canons and whole-act rule comparisons to be more persuasive interpretive tools than substantive
canons—and may thus employ the former more often in an effort
to persuade colleagues to join an opinion. Future studies might
find it useful to explore these and other possible reasons for the
Court’s dramatically different rates of reference to these two
forms of interpretive canons.
E.

Codified Canons and Methodological Stare Decisis

The data regarding the Roberts Court’s substantive canon
use also shed new light on recent calls for methodological stare
decisis—the suggestion that federal courts should adopt a binding statutory interpretation methodology. Recent work has revealed that several state courts and state legislatures have attempted to dictate a binding hierarchy of interpretive tools that
courts in their jurisdictions must follow, in a prescribed order—
what has been called “methodological stare decisis.”291 A leading
example is the three-step interpretive framework adopted by the
Oregon Supreme Court in the case Portland General Electric Co
v Bureau of Labor and Industries.292 That framework imposed a
three-tier hierarchy of interpretive tools that required courts to
consult textual canons at step one, legislative history at step two
if and only if the textual canons prove inconclusive, and substantive canons at step three, only as a last resort if both textual tools
and legislative history prove indeterminate.293 One scholar has labeled this approach “modified textualism” and has suggested that
it may constitute a compromise solution that provides textualism’s

291
292
293

Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1754 (cited in note 20).
859 P2d 1143 (Or 1993).
Id at 1146–47.
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best hope of convincing purposivist judges to adopt a text-centric
interpretive methodology.294
Relatedly, every state legislature in the country has enacted
legislation codifying certain canons of construction that state
courts are expected to follow when interpreting statutes.295 A recent study of these legislated interpretive rules found that only
a handful of judicially created substantive canons make it onto
state legislatures’ lists of preferred interpretive tools.296 Among
these favored substantive canons are the avoidance canon, the
presumption against retroactive application of later-enacted
statutes, and the sovereign immunity canon.297
What is striking about both the state courts’ “modified textualism” and state legislatures’ lists of codified canons is how
much they overlap with the Roberts Court’s current approach to
substantive canons. Notably, modified textualism puts substantive canons last in the hierarchy of interpretive tools, well behind plain meaning, text-based language canons and the wholeact rule, other statutes, and legislative history.298 The members
of the Roberts Court, as Part II showed, likewise invoke substantive canons far less often than they invoke these other interpretive resources.299
The big difference between the Court’s practices and the
methodological approach adopted by several state courts, then,
is the state courts’ commitment not to consult substantive canons at all when textual canons or legislative history provides a
clear answer. The data from the Roberts Court’s first six and a
half terms are not consistent with such a commitment—the justices frequently employed substantive canons alongside
text / plain meaning, language canons / the whole-act rule, or
other statutes (in sixty-two of eighty-seven opinions).
Perhaps even more intriguing, however, is the pattern of
state legislature codification of substantive canons reported in
Jacob Scott’s study.300 Very few substantive canons make it onto
state legislatures’ lists of codified canons. But those that do overlap in important ways with the canons referenced most often by
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1758–59, 1832–34, 1842 (cited in note 20).
Scott, 98 Georgetown L J at 341, 350 & n 35 (cited in note 24).
Id at 382–401.
Id at 384–85, 389–90, 398–99.
See, for example, Portland General Electric, 859 P2d at 1146.
See Tables 1 and 2.
See generally Scott, 98 Georgetown L J 341 (cited in note 24).

KRISHNAKUMAR_ART_SA (RJ) (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Reconsidering Substantive Canons

6/14/2017 11:25 AM

897

the Roberts Court. For example, the substantive canons most often invoked by the Roberts Court were the avoidance canon, the
rule of lenity, the presumption against preemption, various federalism clear statement rules, the sovereign immunity canon,
and the presumption against retroactive application of new
rules.301 Of these, all but the federalism, preemption, and lenity
canons were codified by state legislatures.302 The omission of
these three canons, moreover, is hardly surprising; federalism
clear statement rules and the presumption against preemption
have little application to the judicial review of state laws, and
the rule of lenity is much loathed by legislatures, which tend to
take a “tough on crime” stance303 and have even gone so far as to
enact legislation seeking to abrogate this canon.304
There are also several canons that many state legislatures
have codified that never show up in the Roberts Court’s cases,
such as the presumption that statutes should be construed so as
to “promote justice” or the presumption that remedial statutes
should be liberally construed.305 Still, the fact that three out of six
of the substantive canons most often referenced by the Roberts
Court appear on the short list of substantive canons favored by
state legislatures suggests a noteworthy degree of consensus between the US Supreme Court and legislators about which policybased interpretive rules are most helpful and authoritative in
the judicial interpretation of statutes. It also reinforces the point
emphasized in Part II.C—that the judicial use of substantive
canons may not be nearly as frustrating to legislative intent in
practice as scholars have assumed. Both of these points of convergence, in turn, suggest that substantive canons may be less
threatening, in terms of democratic legitimacy, to the judicial
review of statutes than scholars have feared—on the theory that
legislatures are not likely to endorse interpretive rules that empower courts to undermine or usurp legislative authority.
At the same time, however, the data from the Roberts
Court’s first six and a half terms suggest that neither state
courts’ interpretive hierarchies nor state legislatures’ codified
rules account adequately for the role that judicial precedent
301

See Appendix.
See Scott, 98 Georgetown L J at 382–400 (cited in note 24).
303 Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 957 (cited in note 25).
304 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L
Rev 2162, 2203–04 (2002).
305 Scott, 98 Georgetown L J at 400–01 (cited in note 24).
302
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plays in statutory interpretation. Some state legislative codes of
construction do mention the common law, but none lists judicial
precedent or the courts’ constructions of similar statutes
among the interpretive tools courts should consult. On the one
hand, state legislatures’ failure to include precedent in their
legislated rules may not be shocking, because legislatures may
consider references to precedent to be an inherent part of judicial decision-making, rather than an independent resource or
rule/maxim/canon that itself dictates a particular interpretation.
State courts, similarly, may consider precedent to be something
that courts use as authority for the various textual rules or other
interpretive canons they employ, rather than an independent interpretive tool that directs courts to adopt a particular construction and requires its own place in an interpretive hierarchy. As
discussed in Part III.B, statutory interpretation theory lacks a
clear understanding of whether precedents are used mostly as
authority for other interpretive tools or as interpretive guides
that themselves dictate a particular statutory reading. Again,
future work examining how precisely the Court uses its own
precedents in statutory cases would be illuminating.306
At the federal level, Congress has not prescribed any codes
or rules of statutory construction for courts to follow.307 But recent empirical work based on interviews with congressional
staffers provides some evidence about Congress’s views regarding several of the substantive canons invoked most often by the
Roberts Court.308 Most interestingly, such work reveals that
while congressional staffers do not know the avoidance canon by
name, they want and expect courts to interpret statutes in a
manner that is consistent with the canon’s underlying assumptions.309 That is, the staffers responsible for drafting legislation
indicate that they try hard to legislate within constitutional
bounds, pay attention to prior case law on questions of constitutionality, and expect the Court to err on the side of “upholding

306 As noted, Solan has begun this undertaking. See generally Solan, 94 NC L Rev
1165 (cited in note 265).
307 There is a Dictionary Act, 1 USC § 1, which provides definitions of certain words
that are supposed to apply throughout the United States Code. But the Act does not prescribe any interpretive methodology for courts to follow or provide a hierarchy of tools to
be consulted in any particular order.
308 See Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 940–60 (cited in note 25).
309 See id at 947–48.
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federal statutes” whenever possible.310 This, again, is consistent
with the doctrinal analysis in Part II.C demonstrating that the
Roberts Court has often used the avoidance canon to uphold federal statutes against constitutional challenges and to give effect
to congressional overrides. In other words, despite academic criticism of the avoidance canon, there seems to be widespread legislative support for the canon as a saving mechanism, and the
Court, perhaps surprisingly, seems to be employing the canon
consistently with how legislative staffers expect the canon to
be used.
The Roberts Court’s regular use of federalism canons and
the rule of lenity, by contrast, seems more problematic when
measured against congressional expectations. When interviewed,
congressional staff demonstrated little knowledge of the federalism canons or the rule of lenity,311 and many reported an expectation that when a conflict arises between state and federal laws,
courts should give greater effect to the federal law—the precise opposite of the presumption embodied in the federalism
canons.312
Both the federal and state evidence regarding legislator
preferences, then, suggest that scholars have gotten the story
half right regarding substantive canons. That is, with respect to
the federalism canons and the rule of lenity, the academic consensus that substantive canons operate in a manner that contradicts legislative preferences seems accurate. But for several
other canons regularly employed by the Roberts Court, including
the much-criticized avoidance canon, academic concerns that the
Court invents or prioritizes substantive canons that preserve judicial rather than legislative preferences may be unwarranted.
Indeed, the canons most often invoked by the Court seem to
align with those that state legislators and, to some extent, federal legislators endorse.
At bottom, the data regarding the Roberts Court’s use of
substantive canons teach both that (1) a methodological stare
decisis that ranks substantive canons low in its interpretive hierarchy might be closer to the modern Court’s practices and less
difficult to garner support for—even from textualists—than scholars thus far have assumed; and (2) with two notable exceptions,
310
311
312

Id at 948.
Id at 942–47.
Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 944 (cited in note 25).
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there may be greater consistency between legislative preferences
about substantive canons and the modern Court’s on-the-ground
use of such canons than scholars have recognized.
CONCLUSION
Substantive canons long have received a bum rap from legal
scholars. Commentators have argued that there are too many
substantive canons, that courts invent and reinvent them to suit
their whims, that textualist judges use substantive canons as an
escape valve to end-run plain meaning, and that courts employ
substantive canons in a manner that elevates judicial policy concerns over legislative intent. Most of these claims have been
based on casual observations, with little empirical testing. This
Article offers the first detailed empirical study of the modern
Court’s substantive canon use—with several surprising results.
Its findings suggest that much of the conventional academic account of substantive canons may be wrong, or at least overstated.
Throughout, the Article’s aim has been to illuminate the Court’s
actual practices regarding substantive canons—and to evaluate
the implications that those practices have for statutory interpretation theory.
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APPENDIX. CASES AND SUBSTANTIVE CANONS INVOKED:
2006–2012
Case Name

Canon

Opinion Author

Ideology

*National Federation
of Independent
Business v Sebelius,
132 S Ct 2566 (2012)

Avoidance

Roberts (m)

Liberal

ØReynolds

v United
States, 132 S Ct 975
(2012)

Avoidance

Scalia (d) (avoidance)

Conservative

Rule of lenity

Breyer (m) (rule of
lenity)

Liberal

Ω

Brown v Plata, 563
US 493 (2011)

Avoidance

Kennedy (m)

Liberal

*Citizens United v
Federal Election
Commission, 558 US
310 (2010)

Avoidance

Stevens (c/d)

Liberal

Ω

Jerman v Carlisle,
McNellie, Rini, Kramer
& Ulrich, LPA, 559 US
573 (2010)

Avoidance

Kennedy (d)

Conservative

*Holder v
Humanitarian Law
Project, 561 US 1
(2010)

Avoidance

Breyer (d)

Liberal

*Skilling v United
States, 561 US 358
(2010) (override)

Avoidance

Ginsburg (m)

Liberal

Bartlett v Strickland,
556 US 1 (2009)

Avoidance

Kennedy (p)

Conservative

Ω

Presumption favoring
severability

Rule of lenity


In the Appendix, Ø indicates a “passing” or “minimal reliance” case, Ω indicates a
“some reliance” case, and * indicates a “primary reliance” case. Opinions are coded as
(m), (p), (c), or (d) to indicate whether the canon in question was applied within a majority
opinion, plurality opinion, concurrence, or dissent, while (u) indicates that the opinion applying the canon was unanimous. “Override” indicates a case in which the Court was construing a statute that Congress enacted to override a prior Supreme Court interpretation.

Gonzales v Oregon, 546 US 243 (2006), which employed a substantive canon that
presumes against statutory interpretations that would alter the federal-state balance,
was not included in this study because it fell outside the time period of the study—that
is, it was decided on January 17, 2006, before Justice Alito joined the Court on January
31, 2006.
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Ω

Hawaii v Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, 556
US 163 (2009)

Avoidance

Alito (m) (u)

Unspecifiable

*Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility
District Number One v
Holder, 557 US 193
(2009) (“NAMUDNO”)

Avoidance

Roberts (m)

Liberal

ØFederal

Avoidance

Breyer (d)

Liberal

*Boumediene v Bush,
553 US 723 (2008)
(override)

Avoidance

Roberts (d)

Conservative

ØGonzalez

v United
States, 553 US 242
(2008)

Avoidance

Thomas (d)

Liberal

*Gonzales v Carhart,

Avoidance

Kennedy (m)

Conservative

Ω

Office of Senator
Mark Dayton v
Hanson, 550 US 511
(2007)

Avoidance

Stevens (m) (u)

Conservative

ØRapanos

v United
States, 547 US 715
(2006)

Avoidance

Scalia (p)

Conservative

*Arizona v United
States, 132 S Ct 2492
(2012)

Presumption against
preemption

Alito (c/d)

Conservative

Chamber of Commerce
of the United States of
America v Whiting, 563
US 582 (2011)

Presumption against
preemption

Roberts (m)

Conservative

Equal sovereignty
principle (presumption
against unequal
treatment of the states)

Communications
Commission v Fox
Television Stations,
Inc, 556 US 502 (2009)

550 US 124 (2007)
(override)

Ω

Federalism clear
statement (state has
primary power over
land and water use)
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Presumption against
preemption

Sotomayor (d)
(presumption against
preemption)

Conservative

Non obstante (allowing
implied repeal)

Thomas (p) (non
obstante)

Liberal

Ω

Wyeth v Levine, 555
US 555 (2009)

Presumption against
preemption

Stevens (m)

Conservative

Ω

Altria Group, Inc v
Good, 555 US 70 (2008)

Presumption against
preemption

Stevens (m)

Conservative

Ω

Riegel v Medtronic,
Inc, 552 US 312 (2008)

Presumption against
preemption

Ginsburg (d)

Conservative

Ω

Watters v Wachovia
Bank, NA, 550 US 1
(2007)

Presumption against
preemption

Stevens (d)

Conservative

ØEmpire

HealthChoice
Assurance, Inc v
McVeigh, 547 US 677
(2006)

Presumption against
preemption

Ginsburg (m)

Conservative

ØFowler

Federalism clear
statement
(presumption against
changing the federalstate balance of crime
prosecution)

Breyer (m) (federalism
clear statement)

Liberal

Rule of lenity

Scalia (c) (rule of lenity
and federalism clear
statement)

Liberal

ØBruesewitz

v Wyeth
LLC, 562 US 223
(2011)

Federalism clear
statement (police
powers not superseded
by a federal act)

Sotomayor (d)

Conservative

Ω

Smith v Bayer Corp,
564 US 299 (2011)

Doubts about federal
court injunctions
resolved in favor of
allowing state
proceedings

Kagan (m)

Conservative

*Florida Department of
Revenue v Piccadilly
Cafeterias, Inc, 554 US
33 (2008)

Federalism clear
statement (exemption
from state taxation)

Thomas (m)

Conservative

Ω

v United
States, 563 US 668
(2011)
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*Arlington Central
School District Board
of Education v Murphy,
548 US 291 (2006)

Federalism clear
statement (notice
Spending Clause
condition)

Alito (m)

Conservative

Ω

Barber v Thomas, 560
US 474 (2010)

Rule of lenity

Kennedy (d)

Liberal

ØUnited

States v
Hayes, 555 US 415
(2009)

Rule of lenity

Roberts (d)

Liberal

Dean v United
States, 556 US 568
(2009)

Rule of lenity

ØStevens

Liberal

*ØUnited States v
Santos, 553 US 507
(2008)

Rule of lenity

Ω

United States v
Rodriquez, 553 US 377
(2008)

Rule of lenity

Souter (d)

Liberal

Ω

Begay v United States,
553 US 137 (2008)

Rule of lenity

Scalia (c)

Liberal

ØJames

v United
States, 550 US 192
(2007)

Rule of lenity

Scalia (d)

Liberal

*Federal Aviation
Administration v
Cooper, 132 S Ct 1441
(2012)

Sovereign immunity
(waiver)

Alito (m)

Conservative

ØSossamon

v Texas,
563 US 277 (2011)

Sovereign immunity
(waiver)

Thomas (m)

Conservative

*Permanent Mission of
India to the United
Nations v City of New
York, 551 US 193
(2007)

Sovereign immunity
(waiver)

Stevens (d)

Conservative

ØDolan

v United States
Postal Service, 546 US
481 (2006)

Sovereign immunity
(waiver)

Thomas (d)

Liberal

ØCarcieri

v Salazar,
555 US 379 (2009)

Liberal construction in
favor of Indian tribes

Stevens (d)

Liberal

ØBilski

Elephants in
mouseholes

Stevens (c)

Unspecifiable

ΩØ

v Kappos, 561
US 593 (2010)

Ω

(d)

Breyer (d)

Liberal

*Scalia (p)

Liberal

ØStevens

Liberal

(c)
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ØAli

v Federal Bureau
of Prisons, 552 US 214
(2008)

Elephants in
mouseholes

Breyer (d)

Conservative

*Morrison v National
Australia Bank Ltd,
561 US 247 (2010)

Extraterritorial
application of law

Scalia (m)

Conservative

Ω

Microsoft Corp v
AT&T Corp, 550 US
437 (2007)

Extraterritorial
application of law

Ginsburg (m)

Liberal

ØExxon

Shipping Co v
Baker, 554 US 471
(2008)

No derogation of the
common law

Souter (m)

Conservative

ØBP

America
Production Co v
Burton, 549 US 84
(2006)

Narrow construction
against the
government

Alito (m) (u)

Liberal

ØKucana

v Holder, 558
US 233 (2010)

Presumption favoring
judicial review of
administrative action

Ginsburg (m)

Liberal

*Sackett v
Environmental
Protection Agency, 132
S Ct 1367 (2012)

APA presumption of
judicial review of all
final agency action

Scalia (m) (u)

Liberal

Ω

Knight v
Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 552
US 181 (2008)

Burden on taxpayer
seeking deduction

Roberts (m) (u)

Liberal

ØHamdan

Common law of war
must clearly authorize
trial by military
commission

Stevens (m) (common
law must clearly
authorize)

Liberal

Deference to the
executive on matters
of war

Thomas (d) (deference
to the executive on
war)

Conservative

ØCBOCS

West, Inc v
Humphries, 553 US
442 (2008)

Affirmative evidence of
congressional intent
necessary for an
implied remedy

Thomas (d)

Conservative

*ΩVartelas v Holder,
132 S Ct 1479 (2012)

Presumption against
retroactivity

*Ginsburg (m)

Liberal

v Rumsfeld,
548 US 557 (2006)

Ω

Scalia (d)

Conservative
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ØCarr

v United States,
560 US 438 (2010)

Presumption against
retroactivity

Sotomayor (m)

Liberal

ØAT&T

Corp v
Hulteen, 556 US 701
(2009)

Presumption against
retroactivity

Souter (m)

Conservative

*Fernandez-Vargas v
Gonzales, 548 US 30
(2006)

Presumption against
retroactivity

Souter (m)

Conservative

*eBay Inc v
MercExchange, LLC,
547 US 388 (2006)

Presumption against
major departures from
the “long tradition” of
equity practice

Thomas (m) (u)

Liberal

Roberts (c)

Liberal

ØStoneridge

Investment
Partners, LLC v
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc,
552 US 148 (2008)

No expansion of
private rights of action
beyond congressional
intent

Kennedy (m)

Conservative

*Holland v Florida,
560 US 631 (2010)

Presumption in favor of
equitable tolling
(nonjurisdictional
statutes)

Breyer (m)

Liberal

Constitutional right to
access federal courts
ØWoodford

v Ngo, 548
US 81 (2006)

Constitutional right to
access federal courts

Stevens (d)

Liberal

Ω

Gonzalez v Thaler,
132 S Ct 641 (2012)

Clear statement rule
for statutory limits on
jurisdiction

Sotomayor (m)

Conservative

*Mims v Arrow
Financial Services,
LLC, 132 S Ct 740
(2012)

Presumption in favor of
concurrent state court
jurisdiction

Ginsburg (m) (u)

Liberal

Hardt v Reliance
Standard Life
Insurance Co, 560 US
242 (2010)

Clear statement rule
for attorney’s fee
award

Thomas (m)

Liberal

Ω

Subject-Matter-Specific Canons
ØHenderson

v Shinseki,
562 US 428 (2011)

Ambiguity resolved in
favor of veterans

Alito (m) (u)

Liberal

ØShinseki

Ambiguity resolved in
favor of veterans

Souter (d)

Liberal

v Sanders,
556 US 396 (2009)
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Kawashima v Holder,
132 S Ct 1166 (2012)

Ambiguity construed in
favor of aliens

Ginsburg (d)

Liberal

ØCarachuri-Rosendo

Ambiguity construed in
favor of aliens

Stevens (m)

Liberal

*Felkner v Jackson,
562 US 594 (2011)

AEDPA imposes a
highly deferential
standard (state court
decisions are entitled
to the benefit of doubt)

Per curiam (m) (u)

Conservative

Ω

Riley v Kennedy, 553
US 406 (2008)

Liberal construction of
the Voting Rights Act

Stevens (d)

Liberal

Howard Delivery
Service, Inc v Zurich
American Insurance
Co, 547 US 651 (2006)

Narrow construction of
preferences in the
Bankruptcy Code

Ginsburg (m) (narrow
construction and
equality of
distribution)

Liberal

“Equality of
distribution for similar
creditors” principle

Kennedy (d) (equality
of distribution)

Conservative

Ω

Travelers Casualty &
Surety Co of America v
Pacific Gas & Electric
Co, 549 US 443 (2007)

Clear statement rule
for disallowing state
law claims

Alito (m) (u)

Liberal

ØHall

Street Associates,
LLC v Mattel, Inc, 552
US 576 (2008)

Presumption in favor of
freedom to contract (to
add to what FAA says)

Stevens (d)

Liberal

ØHall

v United States,
132 S Ct 1882 (2012)

Presumption that the
Bankruptcy Code does
not erode past practice
absent clear intent

Sotomayor (m)

Liberal

Ω

Hamilton v Lanning,
560 US 505 (2010)

Presumption that the
Bankruptcy Code does
not erode past practice
absent clear intent

Alito (m)

Liberal

*CompuCredit Corp v
Greenwood, 132 S Ct
665 (2012)

Presumption in favor of
arbitration

Sotomayor (c)

Conservative

ØNken

Presumption “favoring
the retention of longestablished and
familiar principles”

Roberts (m)

Liberal

Ω

v

Holder, 560 US 563
(2010)

Ω

v Holder, 556
US 418 (2009)
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Presumption that an
inventor owns a
property right in a
patentable invention

Roberts (m) (inventor
owns property right)

Conservative

Presumption denying
inventors patent rights
growing out of research
for which the public
has already paid

Breyer (d) (deny if
research paid for by
public)

Liberal

